HKB
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Often appears with: doubt, skepticism, and certainty · reason and the intellect · the nature and attributes of God · perception and the senses · logic, method, and demonstration · language, naming, and meaning · education and the training of the young · wrong start in inquiry · will, choice, and freedom · visible signs · truth and demonstration · suspension of judgment
Usually: argument (8) · exhortation (5) · skepticism (5) · crisis of belief (3) · reflection (2) · censure (2) · curiosity (2) · detachment (1) · indignation (1) · resignation (1)
“It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 · observation
“Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 · insight
“Is that shameful to thee which is not thine own doing, whereof thou art not the cause, which cometh to thee without thy will, like a headache or a fever?” Epictetus (trans. T. W. Rolleston), The Teaching of Epictetus · precept
“With these searching questions the Skeptic cut at the root of all belief, and the problems which they raise have dominated philosophy down to the present day. Nor in two thousand years has any logical answer to them ever been found.” Epictetus (trans. T. W. Rolleston), The Teaching of Epictetus · observation
“But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions” George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowle · insight
“Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it.” George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowle · insight
“This, which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all.” George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowle · insight
“I can symbolize my thought by using the name of any creature, of any fact, because every creature is man agent or patient.” Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays — First Series · insight
He explains the occasion of the Essay: people start at the wrong end by seeking certain truths beyond their capacity, which increases doubts and skepticism instead of guiding conduct.
6. Knowledge of our Capacity a Cure of Scepticism and Idleness. When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the POWERS of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor on the other side, que…
Emerson develops a doctrine of moral and spiritual identity, saying universal fables like Prometheus, and later comparisons to Jesus and skeptics, are truths of recurring human states.
comes up in his private adventures with every fable of Æsop, of Homer, of Hafiz, of Ariosto, of Chaucer, of Scott, and verifies them with his own head and hands. The beautiful fables of the Greeks, being proper creations of the imagination and not of the fancy, are universal verities. What a range of meanings and what perpetual pertinence has the story of Prometheus! Beside its primary value as the first chapter of …
In the introduction, Berkeley argues that philosophy should bring wisdom and calm, but instead produces doubts when people move beyond sense; he claims difficulties come mainly from misuse of faculties and false first principles.
INTRODUCTION 1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common…
Berkeley explains how philosophers say abstraction works, giving examples of separating extension, colour, and motion, and then forming generalized ideas like extension-in-general or colour-in-general.
from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided. 5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the consideration that the largest views are…
Berkeley says removing matter eliminates skepticism by reducing knowledge to ideas and spirits; since sensations exist only as perceived, treating them as “external” makes certainty impossible.
we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order. And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the …
Berkeley argues that treating geometry’s infinitude with special rules is a lazy excuse, and disputes competing views of infinitesimals by claiming they undermine geometry’s foundations.
which is infinitely great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry. 129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are…
He contends God’s existence is more evident than that of other minds because nature’s effects are abundant and surpass human agency, and he emphasizes that people wrongly claim they cannot see God.
maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible. 148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our…
Coleridge contrasts analogies (used to support conviction) with metaphors (used for illustration), warning that confusing likeness of effects with identity of causes leads to superstition and enthusiasm or skepticism.
that is, expressing the *same* subject but with a *difference*, in contra-distinction from metaphors and similitudes, that are always *alle*gorical, that is, expressing a *different* subject but with a resemblance. Of *metaphorical* language, on the other hand, let the following be taken as instance and illustration. I am speaking, we will suppose, of an act, which in its own nature, and as a producing and efficient…
He presents Pyrrho of Elis’s skepticism as rooted in doubts about perception and inference, discusses objections via practical consistency, and concludes that thorough skepticism renews perception each instant.
him that this ideal of indifference was realized in its full perfection by the Gods, who dwelt apart in divine repose while blind necessity had its way with human destiny. Pyrrho of Elis, a rather earlier teacher than Zeno or Epicurus, who is said to have studied philosophy under Indian Gymnosophists and Chaldean Magi, was the originator in European thought of a great and permanent philosophic movement. His school w…
He answers skeptical attacks from Pyrrhonists and Academics, claiming his focus is practice and what concerns him, not abstract disputes, since personal certainty guides action.
*But it is shameful to come to such a necessity!* Then first of all learn what things are shameful, and afterwards tell us thou art a philosopher. But at present suffer not even another man to call thee so. 3. Is that shameful to thee which is not thine own doing, whereof thou art not the cause, which cometh to thee without thy will, like a headache or a fever? If thy parents were poor, or made others their heirs, …