HKB
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Often appears with: reason and the intellect · logic, method, and demonstration · language, naming, and meaning · the nature and attributes of God · fate, destiny, and necessity · perception and the senses · justice as a virtue · religious persecution and toleration · conversion and faith · education and the training of the young · the passions and the emotions · will, choice, and freedom
Usually: argument (653) · skepticism (560) · detachment (326) · crisis of belief (288) · exhortation (166) · reflection (159) · curiosity (118) · censure (106) · commentary or gloss (66) · indignation (49)
“All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · insight
“A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · precept
“The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · insight
“A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · precept
“In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity?” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · insight
“Let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all kinds.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · insight
“External objects press in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · observation
“All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · insight
“Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and contradictions.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · observation
“When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · observation
“At least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the Divine attributes.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · precept
“A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · precept
It returns to themes of resurrection and God’s knowledge, contrasts believers’ trust with infidels’ denial, and emphasizes the Qur’an’s authority as guidance and warning, including an attack on skepticism.
He who doth right-it is for himself:15 and he who doth evil-it is for himself: and thy Lord will not deal unfairly with his servants. With Him alone16 is the knowledge of "the Hour." No fruit cometh forth from its coverings, neither doth any female conceive, nor is she delivered, but with His knowledge. And on that day He shall call men to Him, saying, "Where are the companions ye gave me?" They shall say, "We own t…
Thucydides warns against common Greek misconceptions and explains his method for writing speeches and events from testimony and rigorous checking, claiming the Peloponnesian War was larger than earlier conflicts.
to be apprehended and risk their lives for nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession. There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the…
Ulysses in disguise tells Eumaeus his story, but Eumaeus rejects it as lies, insisting he knows the real situation of Odysseus’s absence and describing his own remote life caring for pigs.
went back to their ship. The gods, having hidden me thus easily, then took me to a good man’s door—for it seems that I am not to die yet awhile.” To this you answered, O swineherd Eumaeus, “Poor unhappy stranger, I have found the story of your misfortunes extremely interesting, but that part about Ulysses is not right; and you will never get me to believe it. Why should a man like you go about telling lies in this w…
Eumaeus the swineherd rejects the beggar’s claims about Odysseus’ return, citing the gods’ hatred of Odysseus and his own discouraging news, then agrees to a covenant test with Zeus as witness.
their hollow ship. And the gods themselves hid me easily and brought me nigh to the homestead of a wise man; for still, methinks, I am ordained to live on.” Then didst thou make answer to him, swineherd Eumaeus: “Ah! wretched guest, verily thou hast stirred my heart with the tale of all these things, of thy sufferings and thy wanderings. Yet herein, methinks, thou speakest not aright, and never shalt thou persuade m…
After denial from the seminary, Crummell continues his plan, becomes a priest and works in Providence, but confronts the third temptation—Doubt—about his work and the race’s ability, ultimately telling the bishop, “I have failed.”
Paul’s the venerable Bishop raised his white arms above the Negro deacon—even then the burden had not lifted from that heart, for there had passed a glory from the earth. And yet the fire through which Alexander Crummell went did not burn in vain. Slowly and more soberly he took up again his plan of life. More critically he studied the situation. Deep down below the slavery and servitude of the Negro people he saw t…
John the Baptist preaches repentance and baptizes in the Jordan, Jesus is baptized, the spirit drives him into the wilderness, and Jesus begins preaching in Galilee while calling disciples.
remission of sins. And all the land of Iewry, and they of Ierusalem went out unto him, and were all baptised of him in the river Iordan, knowledging, their sins. Ihon was clothed with camel's hair, and with a girdle of a beasts skin about his loins. And he ate locusts and wild honey, and preached saying: a stronger than I cometh after me, whose shoe latchet I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose. I have baptised …
Paul recounts suffering in detail and the escape from Damascus, then turns to visions and a “messenger of Satan” to prevent self-exaltation, ending with admonitions to examine themselves.
angel of light. Therefore it is no great thing, though his ministers fashion themselves as though they were the ministers of righteousness: whose end shall be according to their deeds. I say again lest any man think that I am foolish: or else even now take me as a fool, that I may boast myself a little. That I speak, I speak it not after the ways of the lord: but as it were foolishly, while we are now come to boasti…
Paul in Colossians warns against philosophy and deceitful vanity, describes believers’ circumcision and resurrection through Christ, rejects disputes about food and holy days, and urges searching for things above rather than earthly desires.
therefore received Christ Iesu the lord, even so walk rooted and built in him, and steadfast in the faith, as ye have learned: and therein be plenteous in giving thanks. Beware lest any man come and spoil you thorow philosophy and deceitful vanity, thorow the traditions of men, and ordinances after the world, and not after Christ. For in him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, and ye are full in him, wh…
After settling in Crete and suffering pestilence, Aeneas receives a night vision from his household gods correcting a mistaken plan, directing him to search for Italy (Hesperia/Latium-linked) instead of Crete.
father bids me seek the shore Of sacred Delos, and the god implore, To learn what end of woes we might expect, And to what clime our weary course direct. “’Twas night, when ev’ry creature, void of cares, The common gift of balmy slumber shares: The statues of my gods (for such they seem’d), Those gods whom I from flaming Troy redeem’d, Before me stood, majestically bright, Full in the b…
Continuing the Seven Sleepers narrative, the text depicts their waking, the debates over how long they slept, the instruction to avoid argument, and their 309 years in the cave, followed by exhortations to trust God.
This is one of the signs of God. Guided indeed is he whom God guideth; but for him whom He misleadeth, thou shalt by no means find a patron, director. And thou wouldst have deemed them awake,3 though they were sleeping: and we turned them to the right and to the left. And in the entry lay their dog with paws outstretched.4 Hadst thou come suddenly upon them, thou wouldst surely have turned thy back on them in flight…
Sura XI (Houd) opens with a call to worship only God and seek pardon, discusses God’s knowledge and providence, challenges denial of resurrection, and teaches that people’s responses to mercy reveal their character.
And if after trouble hath befallen him we cause him to taste our favour, he will surely exclaim, "The evils are passed away from me." Verily, he is joyous, boastful. Except those who endure with patience and do the things that are right: these doth pardon await and a great reward. Perhaps thou wilt suppress a part of what hath been revealed to thee, and wilt be distress at heart lest they say, "If a treasure be not…
The text continues Noah and then transitions into Qur’anic stories of the Exodus (Israel led through the sea; Pharaoh’s repentance at drowning), Israel’s obedience after knowledge, and Jonah-like Meccan exhortations to avoid doubt and false denial of signs.
He said: "The prayer of you both is heard: pursue ye both therefore the straight path, and follow not the path of those who have no knowledge." And we led the children of Israel through the sea; and Pharaoh and his hosts followed them in eager and hostile sort until, when the drowning overtook him, he said, "I believe that there is no God but he on whom the children of Israel believe, and I am one of the Muslims." …
Plutarch explains a claimed miracle that a statue of Fortune spoke, arguing that articulate voices from inanimate things are impossible, yet conceding reverent people may interpret unusual impressions as divine.
themselves, for a second image of Fortune, which the Romans say uttered, as it was putting up, words to this effect, "Blessed of the gods, O women, is your gift." These words they profess were repeated a second time, expecting our belief for what seems pretty nearly an impossibility. It may be possible enough, that statues may seem to sweat, and to run with tears, and to stand with certain dewy drops of a sanguine …
Kant argues that human reason inevitably generates metaphysical disputes and contradictions when it seeks principles beyond experience, tracing metaphysics’ rise and decline from dogmatism and skepticism to modern indifference, and urging a critical tribunal.
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 1781 Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth a…
Responding to claims of intellectual indifference, Kant says this is not mere levity but mature judgement that calls for a Critical Investigation of Pure Reason to examine reason’s claims without experience.
time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort. For it is in reality vain to profess *indifference* in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended *indifferentists*, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the ass…
Kant claims to have found the source of errors in non-empirical thought by fully examining reason in terms of principles rather than evasive limits, aiming at thorough solutions and rejecting dogmatism’s overreach beyond experience.
impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. This path—the only one now remaining—has been entered upon by me; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of—and consequently the mode of removing—all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in …
Kant contrasts metaphysics as an isolated, purely speculative science independent of experience with the lack of a sure method, since reason repeatedly stalls, contradicts itself, and metaphysicians never permanently win ground.
new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things _à priori_ that which we ourselves place in them.[4] [4] This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that *which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment*. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially …
Kant explains that this method treats pure-reason propositions like reducible experiments by viewing concepts both in relation to possible experience and in isolation as thought, testing harmony versus contradiction.
in the Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature of our representations of space and time, and from the elementary conceptions of the understanding. This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics, after the *example* of the geometricians and natural philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It …
In this second edition Kant says he removed obscurity and misconceptions, keeps the underlying structure unchanged, credits careful prior examination, and adds a new proof about refuting psychological idealism and the objective reality of external intuition.
the Critique of Pure Reason, can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of *science*, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. In this *second edition*, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to remove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine perhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute thinkers. In the propositions themselves…
Kant opens the section by stating that all knowledge begins with experience, but not everything originates in it, introducing the distinction between empirical knowledge and knowledge a priori, including pure and impure a priori cognition.
I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate th…
Kant provides criteria for a priori knowledge: necessity and strict universality, contrasts empirical induction with absolute claims, and illustrates with mathematics and the principle that every change has a cause.
other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori. Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as, for example…
Kant argues that reason can build impressive theoretical systems without checking their foundations, illustrated by mathematicians’ intuitive assumptions and Plato’s leap beyond sense into “pure intellect.”
on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account. Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, independently of all experience, we may carry our à priori knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as they can b…
He claims synthetic a priori judgments lack the support of experience and asks what “X” grounds connecting causes with events, concluding that such principles drive speculative a priori knowledge.
one is not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions. But to synthetical judgements à priori, such aid is entirely wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the synthesis poss…
Kant formulates the universal problem of pure reason: how synthetic judgments a priori are possible, ties this to the fate of metaphysics, and contrasts his view with David Hume’s stopping short.
own argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions à priori—an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him. In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge à priori…
He argues that critique should replace dogmatic metaphysics: analysis prepares but cannot provide synthesis, and a new method must secure reason’s power and limits rather than fueling endless contradiction.
and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism. Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity, because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which is inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her problems; problems which a…
Kant illustrates the distinction between infinite and affirmative judgements, claiming negative predicates like “not mortal” merely limit by excluding a part of the sphere of possible existences, leaving the remainder infinite.
of thought deserves a separate place—though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgements in reference to each other. 2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic abstracts all content of the predicate (tho…
Kant rejects the schoolmen’s transcendental predicate Quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum as logical criteria, arguing they misuse categories of quantity as properties of objects rather than conditions of cognition.
§ 8 In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more leading division, which contains pure conceptions of the understanding, and which, although not numbered among the categories, ought, according to them, as conceptions à priori, to be valid of objects. But in this case they would augment the number of the categories; which cannot be. These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among t…
Kant argues that explaining how we come to use pure concepts by sense impressions is not a deduction, insisting only transcendental deduction can justify their a priori application independent of experience.
they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental. Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their pro…
Kant highlights the difficulty of explaining how subjective thought conditions like causality gain objective validity, noting that mere intuition could present phenomena even without the understanding’s unity.
space and time are pure intuitions, which contain à priori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an à priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity. On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not represent the conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition; objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with thes…
He argues that experience can’t generate the category of causality because empirical laws lack necessity, so the understanding’s causal synthesis must have a priori grounds or be rejected as a chimera.
null, and without significance. Phenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought. If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations by saying: “Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in phenomena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of a…
Kant distinguishes objective unity of apperception from empirical (subjective, contingent) unity of consciousness, arguing that only the transcendental unity is universally and necessarily valid for cognition.
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is § 14 It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold, given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object. On this account it is called objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empir…
Kant holds that thinking an object and cognizing it differ: categories yield cognition only when applied to sensuous intuition, so their legitimate use is within experience and their extension beyond it yields empty forms of thought.
unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and meaning. If, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be given we can in that case represent it by all those predicates which are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition b…
Kant argues that the understanding cannot decide whether possibility exceeds reality or whether multiple possible experiences exist, since “absolute possibility” belongs to reason beyond empirical use.
that is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding. For in the understanding alone is the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their assigned place, possible. Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality, and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity, are interesting enough questions, and quite capable of synthetic solution, questions, how…
Kant defends calling modality principles “postulates,” rejecting mere self-evident acceptance, and says possibility, reality, and necessity reflect how conceptions relate to faculties of cognition rather than add to the object.
which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with a merely critical remark, leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel. Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality postulates. This expres…
Kant frames human knowledge as an “island” of truth within fixed limits, surrounded by an “ocean” of illusion, and argues that before sailing further we must justify our claims and the bounds of cognition.
We have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and carefully surveyed every part of it, but we have also measured it, and assigned to everything therein its proper place. But this land is an island, and enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. It is the land of truth (an attractive word), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fog-bank, many an i…
Kant explains that pure understanding supplies only forms for possible experience, yet its value lies in determining the bounds of understanding so it does not transgress into unfounded claims.
given sufficient answers to these questions, yet a summary recapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction, by uniting in one point the momenta of the arguments. We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether…
Kant distinguishes transcendental from empirical use of conceptions, arguing that conceptions must be grounded in intuition and objective validity depends on possible experience rather than things “in themselves.”
must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when it transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions. That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its à priori principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most important results. A transcendental use is made o…
Kant restates that these conceptions lack corresponding objects when sensuous intuition is removed, so only logical possibility remains, which does not establish real objective meaning.
not self-contradictory, for the transcendental possibility of things—the condition of which is that there be an object corresponding to the conception, is a trick which can only deceive the inexperienced.[38] [38] In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition—the only intuition which we p…
Kant argues the pure categories are only empirically usable and have no transcendental use, then introduces the “noumenon” distinction (phenomena vs things in themselves) and explains where the ambiguity arises.
the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of transcendental use, and that beyond the sphere of possible experience no synthetical à priori principles are possible. It may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sensibility, have a merely transcendental meaning, but are nevertheless not of transcendental use, because t…
Kant says noumena in the negative sense are objects thought beyond sensibility as things in themselves, while noumena in the positive sense would require an intellectual intuition humans lack, making categorical knowledge impossible there.
an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense. The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things…
Kant defines the idea of a noumenon as a problematical, limitative conception needed to restrict sensibility, but he insists that without intuition “beyond” sensibility it stays void and objectless.
objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sensuous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conc…
Kant explains reflection as checking the subjective source of our representations (sensibility or understanding) and distinguishes logical comparison from transcendental reflection, which grounds objective judgment.
Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the Understanding. Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the c…
He argues that merely logical comparison can’t determine whether objects are identical or different across sense versus intellect; only transcendental reflection can place representations in their proper faculty.
of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensibility or understanding? For, on the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these relations. Before constructing any objective judgement, we compare the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement, and observe whether there exists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a general judgement is t…
He develops matter and form as foundational for reflection, contrasts Leibniz’s attempt to found space and time on monads with Kant’s view that space and time are forms of sensibility enabling experience.
like external relation, and therefore also composition or combination, declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with powers of representation, in one word, monads. 4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable…
Kant contrasts transcendental topic with Aristotle’s logical topic, warning that without it one commits amphiboly—substituting objects of pure understanding for phenomena—and thus builds invalid systems like Leibniz’s.
titles of thought, to observe what would best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of profundity. Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect, that they do not represent the object according to that which cons…
He explains how Leibniz misapplies the principle of indiscernibles and the law about non-contradicting realities to spatial phenomena, claiming that real opposition and spatial difference show these are not laws of nature.
Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as things in general merely in the understanding. 1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference—as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions—…
Kant argues Leibniz’s monadology, harmony, and doctrines of space and time follow from confusing internal and external by reflecting only with the understanding, requiring a third cause for coordinated states.
an opposition of reciprocal destruction, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility. 3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on this philosopher’s mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general, mus…
He insists that when things are known only as phenomena, matter’s inner nature is only comparatively internal relations and any 'transcendental object' behind appearances is a barely knowable nescio quid.
themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I know not and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon. I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions of reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and operations it perf…
Kant claims that logical reflection alone compares concepts, but transcendental use without sensory determination becomes self-contradictory, so intelligible objects require a different intuition humans lack.
the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions. When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more than compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether both have the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or not, whether anything is cont…
He argues that Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles fails because abstraction removes spatial and intuitional conditions, so concept-consistency doesn’t entail harmony in reality; phenomena can be relations without internal substrata.
conditions of intuition, that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its conception. The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it, is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in different places (they are numer…
Kant claims that if intelligible objects are things thought via pure categories without sensuous schemata, they are impossible; noumena only make sense as a merely negative limit-concept tied to the failure of sensibility.
to us anything more than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does not contain anything negative—a proposition nobody ever doubted. If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the object…
Kant says understanding limits sensibility without expanding it: it can think an object-in-itself only as a transcendental object, a cause of phenomena, but without categories it yields empty, limit-marking representation and no knowledge.
denied, in the absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for our understanding. Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates…
Kant introduces transcendental dialectic as a logic of appearance, insisting that truth or illusory appearance lies in judgement rather than sense, and that error arises from sensibility’s influence on understanding’s judgements.
I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does not signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must phenomenon and appearance be held to be id…
Kant distinguishes empirical illusion (like optical misperception) from transcendental illusion, which misleads by extending the categories beyond experience, contrasting transcendent principles that overstep limits with immanent ones that stay within experience.
of real cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the action of the understanding and determines it to judgement, sensibility is itself the cause of error. It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgement is misled by the …
Kant argues transcendental illusion cannot be made to disappear like logical illusion: it is natural and unavoidable, using the example that reason seems to prove the world must begin in time due to subjective necessity appearing objective.
still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion. Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding us against it; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be…
Kant defines ideas as necessary conceptions of reason with no corresponding object in sense, distinguishes their speculative insufficiency from their practical fruitfulness, and reiterates their guiding role.
the word absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without any restriction whatever. Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that is, in all respects and relat…
Kant distinguishes transcendental dialectic from logical dialectic and argues that pure reason yields three kinds of dialectical arguments leading reason beyond the conditioned toward the unconditioned it cannot reach.
We are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic, which makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms. Our subject is transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely à priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced conceptions, the object of which cannot be given emp…
He classifies transcendental ideas into psychology, cosmology, and theology, claiming they are necessary products or problems of pure reason, not objects given empirically, and lack objective deduction.
from one object (phenomenon) to all others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary, pure and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason. What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental ideas are will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the guiding thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to the …
He argues that transcendental ideas have no adequate concept of an intuitable object in possible experience, yet pure reason necessarily generates three kinds of sophistical arguments: paralogism, antinomy, and ideal.
risk of being misunderstood, if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical conception thereof. Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical …
Kant explains that a transcendental paralogism can arise from a correct logical form grounded in the nature of human reason, then introduces the proposition “I think” as the basis of rational psychology.
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion. We now come to…