HKB
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Often appears with: doubt, skepticism, and certainty · will, choice, and freedom · reason and the intellect · will vs understanding · will and understanding · verbal dispute · truth and demonstration · theism vs atheism · the nature of affirmation · the nature and attributes of God · skepticism · sense and instinct
Usually: argument (3) · skepticism (3) · crisis of belief (2) · reflection (1) · exhortation (1) · resignation (1)
In the introduction, Berkeley argues that philosophy should bring wisdom and calm, but instead produces doubts when people move beyond sense; he claims difficulties come mainly from misuse of faculties and false first principles.
INTRODUCTION 1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common…
He begins refuting objections by addressing claims that the will has wider scope than understanding, that people can suspend judgment, that affirming seems equal in power to affirming falsely, and the Buridan’s ass problem.
consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought. These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,…
Spinoza responds to objections by arguing that will and feeling are not wider than perception, that “suspension of judgment” is actually inadequate perception, and he illustrates dream certainty by imagining a boy seeing a horse.
bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible. To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of form…
Cleanthes adds that theism is the most intelligible cosmogony and asks why doubts should persist; Philo responds that the dispute is partly verbal because analogies between nature’s effects imply proportional analogies in their cause.
still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence! Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger proofs o…