HKB
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Often appears with: public finance and debt · justice as a virtue · equity, mercy, and pardon · voluntary conventions · tribunals and judges · taxation, tribute, and revenue · self-love · repayment vs forgiveness · property, inheritance, and title · preservation of property · penalties of death · natural virtues vs justice
Usually: argument (5) · detachment (4) · injustice endured (1) · exhortation (1)
“Whereas a single act of justice, considered in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and it is only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature · insight
“Tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.” John Locke, Second Treatise of Government · insight
Locke defines political power as a magistrate’s right to make laws with penalties (including death) to regulate and preserve property and defend the commonwealth, only for the public good.
OF THE STATE OF NATURE. Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality…
Locke argues that where legislative and executive powers are separate, the executive must have discretion to act for the community’s good when laws cannot foresee or cover every case, including suspending strict legal severity and granting pardons to preserve all members.
OF PREROGATIVE. Sect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there the good of the society requires, that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor …
He adds that legal rules for rights and obligations are changeable and aimed at public good, so they originate from adjusted self-love, and not an innate regard for the common welfare.
conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public; though it be not intended for that purpose by die inventors. (2) In the second place we may observe, that all kinds of vice and virtue run insensibly into each other, and may approach by such imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deter…
Hume distinguishes natural virtues from justice: kindness benefits each act, but justice needs a whole legal scheme, since single decisions can harm the public; law is created by voluntary conventions.
far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss. The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and justice lies in this, that the good, which results from the former, arises from every single act, and is the object of some natural passion: Whereas a single act of justice, considered in itself, may often be contr…
Seneca proposes reciprocal accounting: the recipient should feel released while the benefactor feels obliged, urging judgment by the public good and warning that excuses for failing to repay should not be accepted.
am bound to return, anything beside my gratitude, why should that which is all that I can bestow on a god be insufficient to prove my gratitude towards a man? XVI. If, however, you ask me what I really think, and wish me to give a definite answer, I should say that the one party ought to consider his benefit to have been returned, while the other ought to feel that he has not returned it; the one should release his …