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Often appears with: reason and the intellect · language, naming, and meaning · nominal essence · doubt, skepticism, and certainty · word essence meaning · species classification · judgment · gold example · genus and species · affirmation and negation · adequacy
Usually: argument (3) · detachment (2) · skepticism (1)
“Truth lies in so joining or separating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree; and falsehood in the contrary, as shall be more fully shown hereafter.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 · precept
“The essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea comprehended and marked by that name.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2 · insight
Locke concludes that truth or falsehood requires affirmation or negation (a judgment), while ideas themselves are never simply false; errors arise when judgments wrongly fit ideas to other minds, existence, adequacy, or essence.
19. Truth or Falsehood always supposes Affirmation or Negation. Though, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have shown in what sense and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called true or false; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cases where any idea is called true or false, it is from some JUDGMENT that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is true or false. Fo…
Locke explains multiple meanings of “essence,” distinguishing real essence as a thing’s being or internal constitution from nominal essence as the constructed essence used in genus/species disputes.
17. Supposition, that Species are distinguished by their real Essences useless. Concerning the REAL ESSENCES of corporeal substances (to mention these only) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those who, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, …
Locke argues that we cannot form species of substances by knowing their real essences, since we do not know the real essence and thus cannot know all the properties that must cohere for gold or any kind.
19. Our Nominal Essences of Substances not perfect collections of the properties that flow from the Real Essence. Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. But neither can this be done. For, being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is i…