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Executive independence

5 passages · search this phrase →

Often appears with: separation of powers and checks · political legitimacy and consent · forms of government · elections and representation · vice-president election · tyranny and despotism · suspensive veto · separation of powers · senate oversight of foreign relations · risk of executive encroachment · qualified leadership · presidential re-election term

Usually: argument (5) · detachment (2) · injustice endured (1) · exhortation (1) · praise (1)

Quotable
“There is no country in the world in which everything can be provided for by the laws, or in which political institutions can prove a substitute for common sense and public morality.” Alexis de Tocqueville, American Institutions and Their Influence · insight

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(254/342)

He explains how President and Vice-President are chosen by electors, how the House selects among top vote-getters if no majority exists, and he argues this yields qualified leaders and stable executive independence.

of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office. The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popular…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(274/342)

Hamilton argues that a four-year executive term may not fully guarantee independence but it materially strengthens executive character, while not threatening liberty, because legislative and constitutional checks remain possible.

for that reason, be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the magistrate. It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character o…

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1 primary

United States. Constitutional Convention (recorded by James Madison) · 1787 (composed during the convention; Madison’s notes later revised)
part of the Fifth Article of the Confederation of the said > part of Virg^a is now on the point of a separation. In the province of (43/50)

Madison argues that preserving liberty requires separating legislative, executive, and judiciary powers by making the executive independent of the legislature, analogizing it to judicial independence through fixed tenure to avoid tyranny.

is now re-eligible, he will be on good behavior as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well he will be continued; if otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election. M^r Madison.[135] If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other. The Executive could not be…

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2 primary

United States. Constitutional Convention · 1787-07-19 to 1787-09-17 (convention debates recorded; excerpts reflect entries in the official journal as presented here)
Act to which the States by their Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself. (4/35)

On July 24, delegates reconsider how the executive is appointed, weighing appointment by a national legislature versus electors chosen by state legislatures, with concerns about independence, complexity, and kingship-like effects.

The appointment of the Executive by Electors reconsidered. M^r Houston moved that he be appointed by the "Nat^l Legislature," instead of "Electors appointed by the State Legislatures" according to the last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improbability, that capable men would undertake the service of Electors from the more distant States. M^r Spaight seconded the motion. M^r Gerry opposed it. He thoug…

American Institutions and Their Influence primary

Alexis de Tocqueville · c. 1830s–1840s (composed as part of the two-volume study published later in the 1830s/early 1840s); this American edition reprints the work in 1851
CHAPTER I. > CHAPTER VIII. (7/50)

Tocqueville argues that in the U.S. republican system the executive must be answerable to the people’s will, with checks like the Senate’s oversight and the president’s suspensive veto guarding independence.

own sphere. It was indispensable to the maintenance of the republican form of government that the representatives of the executive power should be subject to the will of the nation. The president is an elective magistrate. His honor, his property, his liberty, and his life, are the securities which the people has for the temperate use of his power. But in the exercise of his authority he cannot be said to be perfect…