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Elections and representation

60 passages · search this phrase →

Often appears with: political legitimacy and consent · faction, party, and civil strife · forms of government · justice as a virtue · assemblies, councils, and senates · counsel and advisers to rulers · corruption, patronage, and bribery · constitutions and founding law · rights and liberties · crime and punishment · diplomacy and embassies · conquest, plunder, and captives

Usually: argument (308) · detachment (189) · skepticism (117) · narrative (91) · indignation (70) · injustice endured (63) · exhortation (57) · curiosity (47) · censure (36) · the fall of the great (31)

Quotable
“Suspicion is the companion of mean souls, and the bane of all good society.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense · insight
“A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense · insight
“Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense · insight
“There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of OBTAINING, by MERITING, a continuance of them.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · insight
“Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · observation
“With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men?” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · wit
“Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · observation
“In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · insight
“To-day the black man of the South has almost nothing to say as to how much he shall be taxed, or how those taxes shall be expended; as to who shall execute the laws, and how they shall do it; as to who shall make the laws, and how they shall be made.” W. E. B. Du Bois (William Edward Burghardt Du Bois), The Souls of Black Folk · observation
“But an elected magistrate can neither be cashiered nor promoted. All elective functions are inalienable until their term is expired.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America — Volume 1 · observation
“The courts of justice are the only possible medium between the central power and the administrative bodies; they alone can compel the elected functionary to obey, without violating the rights of the elector.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America — Volume 1 · insight
“It was therefore established that every State should name a certain number of electors, *v who in their turn should elect the President; and as it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief magistrate had been entrusted in elective countries inevitably became the centres of passion and of cabal; that they sometimes usurped an authority which did not belong to them; and that their proceedings, or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were sometimes prolonged so much as to endanger the welfare of the State, it was determined that the electors should all vote upon the same day, without being convoked to the same place.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America — Volume 1 · insight

Collected Articles of Frederick Douglass primary

Frederick Douglass · 1881
(14/16)

Douglass argues the federal government cannot protect individuals in distant states without voters’ equal political power, and he insists only enfranchisement can make slavery’s return impossible.

consistent with itself, and give to every loyal citizen the elective franchise,—a right and power which will be ever present, and will form a wall of fire for his protection. One of the invaluable compensations of the late Rebellion is the highly instructive disclosure it made of the true source of danger to republican government. Whatever may be tolerated in monarchical and despotic governments, no republic is safe…

Collected Articles of Frederick Douglass primary

Frederick Douglass · 1881
(16/16)

Douglass portrays the President’s campaign against Congress’s reconstruction plan as disgraceful, then argues Congress must begin with a “clean slate” in the former Confederate states and protect loyal Black and white citizens through enfranchisement.

by the people. The high reconstructive powers which he so confidently, ostentatiously, and haughtily claimed, have been disallowed, denounced, and utterly repudiated; while those claimed by Congress have been confirmed. Of the spirit and magnitude of the canvass nothing need be said. The appeal was to the people, and the verdict was worthy of the tribunal. Upon an occasion of his own selection, with the advice and a…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (13/495)

On July 1, Pepys describes Lord Bristol’s Commons speech about Sir Richard Temple, the House voting Temple innocent, and subsequent gossip on Digby’s reception and Sir Charles Sedley’s trial.

Richard Temple innocent; and that my Lord Digby hath cleared the honour of His Majesty, and Sir Richard Temple's, and given perfect satisfaction of his own respects to the House. 2nd. Walking in the garden this evening with Sir G. Carteret and Sir J. Minnes, Sir G. Carteret told us with great content how like a stage-player my Lord Digby spoke yesterday, pointing to his head as my Lord did, and saying, "First, for …

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (316/495)

At Whitehall Pepys and officials discuss a Navy business in front of the King, who dismisses the complexity, and Pepys notes Buckingham’s return to power and the growth of bankers’ credit in London.

Tom Wilson's for his place of Store- keeper at Chatham, and is resolved never to take any thing: which is both wise in him, and good to the King's service. 25th. With Sir H. Cholmly (who came to me about his business) to White Hall: and thither came also my Lord Brouncker. And we by and by called in, and our paper read; and much discourse thereon by Sir G. Carteret, my Lord Anglesy, Sir W. Coventry, and my Lord A…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (460/495)

Pepys describes court scandal and diplomacy: the King dining at the Dutch ambassador’s, Rochester offending Tom Killigrew, and courtly discussion of Privy Seale going to Ireland, plus talk of a future parliamentary seat.

that the King would run himself out beyond all his credit and funds, and then we should too late find it impossible; which is, he says, now come to pass. 15th. To the plaisterer's, and there saw the figure of my face taken from the mould; and it is most admirably like, and I will have another made before I take it away. At the 'Change I did at my bookseller's shop accidentally fall into talk with Sir Samuel Tuke […

Diary of Samuel Pepys — Volume 01: Preface and Life secondary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-1669 (diary as a whole); this volume’s prefatory/editorial material is 1893
(13/21)

After Elizabeth Pepys’s death in November 1669, the editor covers Pepys’s attempts to enter Parliament at Aldborough and Castle Rising, and the later House of Commons inquiry into an alleged altar or crucifix.

great grief of her husband. She died at their house in Crutched Friars, and was buried at St. Olave's Church, Hart Street, where Pepys erected a monument to her memory. Pepys's successful speech at the bar of the House of Commons made him anxious to become a member, and the Duke of York and Sir William Coventry heartily supported him in his resolution. An opening occurred in due course, at Aldborough, in Suffolk, o…

The History of the Peloponnesian War primary

Thucydides · Composed beginning at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (traditionally 431 BCE); continued thereafter (Book I–VIII survive; work unfinished).
BOOK I > CHAPTER XVIII (7/15)

Nicias urges voting against the expedition, criticizing would-be commanders driven by personal ambition and horse-wealth, and asks the Prytanis to put the question again to the vote.

the public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand. “When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thoug…

On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection primary

Charles Darwin · 1837-1859 (major composition period; published 1859)
CHAPTER I. VARIATION UNDER DOMESTICATION. > CHAPTER I. (20/22)

He gives further cases of gradual improvement via unconscious selection—pointers, racehorses, English cattle—and illustrates how long-pure breeding can still yield strikingly different strains.

effectually, that, though the old Spanish pointer certainly came from Spain, Mr. Borrow has not seen, as I am informed by him, any native dog in Spain like our pointer. By a similar process of selection, and by careful training, the whole body of English racehorses have come to surpass in fleetness and size the parent Arab stock, so that the latter, by the regulations for the Goodwood Races, are favoured in the weig…

On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection primary

Charles Darwin · 1837-1859 (major composition period; published 1859)
CHAPTER I. VARIATION UNDER DOMESTICATION. > CHAPTER XIII. (18/27)

He explains metamorphosis patterns using cirripedes and other examples, arguing that embryos can appear more ‘highly organised’ than adults and that developmental trajectories fit descent with modification.

an unmistakeable manner. So again the two main divisions of cirripedes, the pedunculated and sessile, which differ widely in external appearance, have larvæ in all their several stages barely distinguishable. The embryo in the course of development generally rises in organisation: I use this expression, though I am aware that it is hardly possible to define clearly what is meant by the organisation being higher or l…

The Souls of Black Folk primary

W. E. B. Du Bois (William Edward Burghardt Du Bois) · 1903
(85/130)

Du Bois argues over Negro suffrage by tracing how Americans shifted from universal suffrage ideals after the French Revolution to acceptance of suppression, concluding that disfranchisement aims to eliminate Black political power.

the modern world is the power of the ballot; and this brings me to a consideration of the third form of contact between whites and blacks in the South,—political activity. In the attitude of the American mind toward Negro suffrage can be traced with unusual accuracy the prevalent conceptions of government. In the fifties we were near enough the echoes of the French Revolution to believe pretty thoroughly in universa…

The Souls of Black Folk primary

W. E. B. Du Bois (William Edward Burghardt Du Bois) · 1903
(86/130)

He warns that removing Black voters prevents civic training and lets exploitation by the worst flourish, since a modern industrial system requires political voice, and disfranchisement leaves Black people voiceless on taxation, laws, and execution.

by open and unblushing bribery, or force and fraud; until the Negro voter was thoroughly inoculated with the idea that politics was a method of private gain by disreputable means. And finally, now, to-day, when we are awakening to the fact that the perpetuity of republican institutions on this continent depends on the purification of the ballot, the civic training of voters, and the raising of voting to the plane of…

The first New Testament printed in English primary

William Tyndale · 1520s; English translation of the Pentateuch and New Testament material issued in the 1520s (later printed English Bible contents in this edition).
Chapter .j. > Chapter .xxxj.

Moses, aged 120, tells Israel Joshua will lead them across the Jordan, instructs priests to read the law every seven years during the Feast of Tabernacles, and commissions Joshua as Moses dies.

And Moses went and spake these words unto all Israel and said unto them: I am an hundred and twenty years old this day, and can no more go out and in. Also the LORD hath said unto me, thou shalt not go over this Iordan. The LORD your God he will go over before thee and he will destroy these nations before thee, and thou shalt conquer them. And Iosua he shall go over before thee, as the LORD hath said. And the LORD sh…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
(9/12)

Postumius continues his justification: surety compacts can bind only if the people authorise them, so consuls should be treated as atonements while tribunes can’t be surrendered until after their term, with war renewed.

by becoming sureties to the peace, preserved the army of the Roman people; nor, finally, could they, being sacred and inviolable, be surrendered to the enemy or treated with violence." 9. To this Postumius replied, "In the mean time surrender us as unsanctified persons, which ye may do, without offence to religion; those sacred and inviolable personages, the tribunes, ye will afterwards deliver up as soon as they go…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIII. (23/48)

A new dictator is questioned about elections and state condition, elections are held for consuls and praetors, and fresh disaster arrives from Gaul: the consul-elect Lucius Posthumius is annihilated in a deadly wood trap.

and, according to custom, on the following night nominated Marcus Fabius Buteo dictator, for six months, without a master of the horse, in pursuance of the decree of the senate. 23. He having mounted the rostrum attended by the lictors, declared, that he neither approved of there being two dictators at one time, which had never been done before, nor of his being appointed dictator without a master of the horse; nor …

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIII. (31/48)

The senate doubles taxes, reallocates armies to Sicily and Campania, and manages elections amid omens; it records prodigies and the election dynamics involving Marcus Marcellus and Quintus Fabius Maximus.

that Marcus Marcellus should be in command as proconsul, because he was the only Roman general who had been successful in his operations in Italy since the defeat at Cannae. 31. The senate decreed, the first day they deliberated in the Capitol, that double taxes should be imposed for that year, one moiety of which should be immediately levied, as a fund from which pay might be given forthwith to all the soldiers, ex…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIV. (9/48)

At Rome’s consul election amid the Punic War, Quintus Fabius Maximus urges careful selection to face Hannibal and frames the decision using past cavalry duels and storm-sea piloting metaphors.

fallen by lot on the junior century of the Anien tribe, they appointed Titus Otacilius and Marcus Aemilius Regillus, consuls, when Quintus Fabius, having obtained silence, delivered the following speech: 8. "If we had either peace in Italy, or had war with such an enemy that the necessity to be careful was less urgent than it is, I should consider that man as wanting in respect for your liberty, who would at all imp…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIV. (10/48)

Otacilius disputes the election, but the prerogative century votes again; Fabius Maximus and Marcellus are confirmed consuls, praetors are re-elected or newly chosen, and floods prompt record-keeping of disaster.

melancholy precedents to look back upon, but form useful warnings to guard against similar disasters Crier, call back the younger century of the Amen tribe to give their votes again" 9. Titus Otacilius, vociferating in the most furious manner, that his object was to continue in the consulship, the consul ordered the lictors to go to him, and as he had not entered the city, but had proceeded directly without halting …

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIV. (23/48)

At dawn the armed Syracusan populace gathers at the senate-house in the Achradina, hears Polyaenus’s speech, dispatches ambassadors to Andranodorus, and then holds new elections under shifting control.

who had been appointed to garrison it, and these sent messengers to the Achradina, to give information that the granaries and the corn were in the power of the senate. 22. At break of day the whole populace, armed and unarmed, assembled at the senate-house in the Achradina: where from the altar of Concord, which stood there, one of the nobles, named Polyaenus, delivered a liberal and temperate address. He said, that…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIV. (24/48)

After Andranodorus’s speech and public handover of keys and treasure, the Syracusan assembly elects praetors, transports royal funds, demolishes a separating wall, and deals with Hannibal-linked generals.

glory is only beginning, not yet perfected; and there still remains great danger lest the enfranchised state should be destroyed, if you do not provide for its tranquillity and harmony." 23. At the conclusion of this speech, he laid the keys of the gates and of the royal treasure at their feet; and on that day, retiring from the assembly in the highest spirits, they made supplication with their wives and children at…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIV. (27/48)

Heraclea, daughter of Hiero, pleads to avoid being killed, but is dragged from a sanctuary and murdered with her daughters, then the people demand new elections to replace the dead praetors.

death; and persons despatched for the purpose by the praetors, put to death Demarata, the daughter of Hiero, and Harmonia, the daughter of Gelon, the wives of Andranodorus and Themistus. 26. There was a daughter of Hiero, named Heraclea, the wife of Zoippus, who, having been sent by Hieronymus as ambassador to king Ptolemy, had become a voluntary exile. As soon as she was apprized that they were coming to her also, …

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIV. (28/48)

After Heraclea’s killing, Epicydes and Hippocrates are unexpectedly elected as praetors amid soldiers and deserters, while Roman and Carthaginian movements heighten fear and distrust in Syracuse.

demanded an election to supply the places of Andranodorus and Themistus, for both of them had been praetors; an election by no means likely to be agreeable to the praetors. 27. The day was fixed for the election, when, to the surprise of all, one person from the extremity of the crowd nominated Epicydes, and then another from the same quarter nominated Hippocrates. Afterwards the voices in favour of these persons in…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXV. (5/42)

After the assembly is dismissed, the senate and people argue Posthumius Pyrgensis’s disruption of voting; he is tried for capital crimes and ultimately condemned by absence, with promoters indicted and many exiled.

said, "Do you not see that you are degraded to the common rank, and that an insurrection will be the result, unless you speedily dismiss the assembly of the commons." 4. The commons being dismissed, the senate was assembled, when the consuls proposed the consideration of the interruption experienced by the assembly of the commons, in consequence of the violence and audacity of the farmers of the revenue. They said, …

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXVI. (17/51)

At Rome, after attention shifts to Spain, the people elect Publius Cornelius Scipio despite his youth and ominous family mourning; Livy emphasizes the crowd’s internal doubt right after the vote.

ability of the Romans to punish their faithless allies, and how little assistance could be derived from Hannibal towards the defence of those whom he had taken under his protection. 17. The Roman senate having gone through every thing which required their attention relative to Capua, decreed to Caius Nero six thousand foot and three hundred horse, whichever he should himself choose out of those two legions which he …

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXVI. (22/51)

With Apulia and Macedonia assigned by lot, Titus Manlius Torquatus forces the junior Veturian century to re-vote, leading to consuls Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Marcus Valerius.

the states which had revolted; out of which he gave Murgantia to those Spaniards who were entitled to a city and land, in conformity with the decree of the senate. 22. As both the consuls had Apulia for their province, and as there was now less to be apprehended from Hannibal and the Carthaginians, they were directed to draw lots for the provinces of Apulia and Macedonia. Macedonia fell to the lot of Sulpicius, who …

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXVI. (25/51)

Laevinus attacks Anticyra in Locris, storms and takes it by sea and land, then returns to Rome where he learns of his consulship and Marcellus’ arrival prompts senate business.

and also considering that Philip was sufficiently engaged in war with his neighbours to prevent his thinking of Italy, the Carthaginians, and his compact with Hannibal, he retired to Corcyra. 25. To Philip intelligence of the defection of the Aetolians was brought while in winter quarters at Pella. As he was about to march an army into Greece at the beginning of the spring, he undertook a sudden expedition into the …

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
(22/52)

Marcellus’s command is defended in the Flaminian circus, clearing him of charges and winning him consulship; fears about Etruria lead to him being sent there, and senatorial business addresses Tarentum.

happened that nearly at the same time, Marcellus, and Quintius Fulvius the consul, came to Rome, the former to exonerate himself from ignominy, the latter on account of the elections. 21. The question touching Marcellus's command was debated in the Flaminian circus, in the presence of an immense concourse of plebeians and persons of every rank. The plebeian tribune accused, not only Marcellus, but the nobility gener…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
(35/52)

The senate chooses Caius Claudius Nero and secures Marcus Livius for consul despite Livius’s long exile after disgrace, recounting Senate deliberations, public opposition, and the political reconciliation that follows.

engage the enemy, but the immortal gods, in pity to the Roman name, had spared the unoffending armies, and doomed the consuls to expiate their temerity with their own lives. 34. On the fathers' looking round to see whom they should appoint as consuls, Caius Claudius Nero appeared pre-eminently. They then looked out for a colleague for him, and although they considered him a man of the highest talents, they also were…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXI. (42/42)

Livy reports Roman state actions and elections: triumph arrangements, celebrating Publius Scipio’s African vowed games, colonization at Venusia, battles in Spain, and games and corn distributions under cheap provisions.

He carried into the treasury three hundred and twenty thousand *asses*,[1] and one hundred and seventy thousand pounds' weight of silver. There were neither any prisoners led before his chariot, nor spoils carried before him, nor did any soldiers follow him. It appeared that every thing, except the victory, belonged to the consul. The games which Publius Scipio had vowed when consul in Africa, were then celebrated, i…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXIV. (39/50)

Livy shifts to Roman politics: Quinctius writes from Lacedaemon, the senate grants days of supplication, consuls and praetors are elected, and proposals for Ferentinum and other colonists to receive Roman citizenship are debated.

Some colonists, who had given in their names for Puteoli, Salernum, and Buxentum, assumed, on that ground, the character of Roman citizens; but the senate determined that they were not. 43. In the beginning of the year, wherein Publius Scipio Africanus, a second time, and Tiberius Sempronius Longus were consuls, two ambassadors from the tyrant Nabis came to Rome. The senate gave them audience in the temple of Apollo…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXIV. (49/50)

Publius Scipio returns from Gaul to hold consular elections; new consuls, praetors, and aediles are chosen, the Megalesian games begin with senatorial separation from the people, and earthquakes prompt public rites and provincial lots.

provinces. Cornelius obtained Gaul; Minucius, Liguria; Caius Scribonius, the city jurisdiction; Marcus Valerius, the foreign; Lucius Cornelius, Sicily; Lucius Porcius, Sardinia; Caius Flaminius, Hither Spain; and Marcus Fulvius, Farther Spain. 56. While the consuls supposed that, for that year, they should have no employment of a military kind, a letter was brought from Marcus Cincius, who was commander at Pisae, an…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXV. (8/43)

As elections near, Lucius Cornelius returns to Rome to demand thanksgiving and triumph, but Metellus objects due to contradictory letters and feared bias, prompting tribunes Marcus and Caius Titinius to announce protests against premature senate action.

to ride into the city in triumph; the plebeian tribunes, Marcus and Caius Titinius, declared, that they would enter their protest, if the senate passed any decree on the subject. 9. In the preceding year, Sextus Aelius Paetus and Caius Cornelius Cethegus were created censors. Cornelius now closed the lustrum. The number of citizens rated was a hundred and forty-three thousand seven hundred and four. Extraordinary qu…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXV. (10/43)

With the year ending, Livy describes intense consulship election rivalry, listing prominent patrician and plebeian candidates, explaining how Marcus/Quinctius’ recent triumph and brotherly backing shape outcomes, and naming elected consuls and senior magistrates plus major public works.

which they added a wharf on the Tiber: and another, reaching from the Frontinal gate to the altar of Mars, to serve as a passage into the field of Mars. 11. For a long time, nothing worth recording had occurred in Liguria; but, towards the end of this year, the Roman affairs there were twice brought into great peril; for the consul's camp, being assaulted, was with difficulty preserved; and a short time after, as th…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXV. (23/43)

With war’s outbreak near, the senate accelerates elections of consuls, appoints new praetors including Lucius Oppius Salinator, and orders Marcus Baebius to move forces from Brundusium to Epirus.

and every accommodation; that he should be presented with two horses, two suits of horsemen's armour, vases of silver to a hundred pounds' weight, and of gold to twenty pounds. 24. As one messenger after another brought intelligence that the war was on the point of breaking out, it was judged expedient that consuls should be elected as soon as possible. Wherefore the senate passed a decree, that the praetor, Marcus …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(36/342)

The essay compares small republics and large republics, arguing that representation improves public judgment while broader electorates and wider territory hinder concerted oppression, and that the Constitution balances national and local interests through states.

or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(48/342)

Madison responds to critics who claim republican government cannot cover vast territory, arguing that republics use representatives and can be large, then defending the Constitution’s practicable scope across the Union’s distance.

To the People of the State of New York: We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to o…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(128/342)

He challenges the claim that the House of Representatives must include every class by class-specific delegates, arguing that true “class representation” is unrealistic and unnecessary because occupations vote for aligned interests.

the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed. Let us now return to the examination of objections. One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in order to combine the …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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In Federalist No. 49, Madison reviews Jefferson’s proposed convention-trigger rule (two-thirds concurrence) for correcting constitutional breaches, but objects that it may not address two-department alliances and would weaken stability by frequent popular appeals.

the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately re…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton outlines the House of Representatives’ design: suffrage must be defined in the Constitution, elected representatives must meet specific eligibility requirements, and biennial elections are defended as necessary for dependence on the people.

some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is n…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton supports biennial elections by comparing them to British and Irish parliamentary arrangements, arguing that frequent elections constrain representatives even under imperfect conditions and would thus safeguard liberty in the United States.

in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistak…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison argues that Virginia was first to resist Britain and to adopt independence, then claims that biennial House elections cannot endanger liberty because the federal legislature has limited power and will be watched by other institutions.

frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison replies to the proverb “where annual elections end, tyranny begins” by comparing state election cycles, arguing that liberty is secured by a paramount Constitution rather than fixed election intervals.

To the People of the State of New York: I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. “ If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton or Madison argues that when there is no higher Constitution, governments may change election periods and even extend themselves, creating alarm that annual elections supposedly prevent, but that such fears do not apply federally.

They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison defends biennial House elections by claiming legislators need time to acquire practical knowledge, especially for federal lawmaking across diverse states and the complex tasks of Union governance.

does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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The author adds that federal legislators must learn foreign affairs and that travel distances and the need to prevent reliance on established incumbents support two-year service rather than one-year terms.

But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it. A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison introduces the apportionment rule for House seats based on the same standard as direct taxes, arguing numbers best represent people’s rights though wealth-measures are imperfect.

To the People of the State of New York: The next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The e…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison addresses whether slaves should count in apportionment by presenting the Southern defense that slaves are both persons and property, and by arguing constitutional representation must compromise on their status.

on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of th…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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The author claims that even if slaves cannot vote, they must still be included as inhabitants in the census, since each state determines voting rights while federal apportionment counts population.

certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives. In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own in…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison adds that government protects property as well as persons, and he argues representation may justly reflect comparative state wealth because federal voting gives each representative equal weight like local legislative votes.

a still more ready defense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton answers New York’s objections to the House’s small size, listing fears about unsafe representation, insufficient local knowledge, class bias, and rising disproportionality as populations grow, then criticizes number-crunching as politically misleading.

indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous c…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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He argues that with Congress’s limited powers and biennial elections, a small House can safely represent the public, projecting representation growth from sixty-five toward four hundred as population increases.

Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require, the members of the Congress …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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He further supports representative adequacy by citing Great Britain’s House of Commons election ratios and warning that British representation is flawed more by systemic factors than ignorance, concluding that one representative per thirty thousand can work.

few representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States. The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just th…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton rejects the third charge that the House will elevate a few, arguing that republican elections empower the whole people, bar qualifications like wealth or birth, and rely on frequent elections to keep representatives accountable.

To the People of the State of New York: The third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordi…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton argues that the objection’s deeper claim—that people cannot choose trustworthy rulers—undermines republican government; he compares federal elections to state elections and challenges the logic as both unreasonable and unsupported by facts.

of Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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He concludes that larger electorates should improve the odds of selecting fit representatives, then contrasts British property and voting qualifications with American district practices in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York.

the State governments, and an abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the objection turns, it deserves to be examined. Is it supported by REASON? This cannot be said, without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison argues that state-level election practices—where cities, counties, and whole-state constituencies choose officials—have not increased corruption, so diffusive election methods do not inherently elevate traitors or undermine liberty.

as will be necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose; and those of New York still more so. In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five representativ…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Madison responds to the claim that the House will not grow with population by explaining census-based reapportionment every ten years and the legal limit of one representative per thirty thousand inhabitants.

To the People of the State of New York: The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand. It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other objections ag…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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He argues that because the House represents citizens while the Senate represents states, larger states will push reapportionment, and even if smaller states oppose in the Senate, the House’s majority and growing-state interests will support additions.

a coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution. It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be indispensable, the just and …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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He warns that multiplying representatives may make government more democratic in appearance but more oligarchic in reality, and he rejects raising quorum/majority requirements because it would transfer rule to minorities and enable secession.

single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the b…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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Hamilton defends Congress’s power to regulate elections by arguing that every government must contain means for its own preservation, allowing Congress to adjust election rules while leaving ordinary regulation to states.

To the People of the State of New York: The natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It is in these words: “The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
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He argues that if states had exclusive control over federal election regulations, they could effectively end the Union by obstructing elections, so a reserved congressional power is the rational constitutional safeguard.

They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, without an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that risk. The extra…