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Corruption, patronage, and bribery

60 passages · search this phrase →

Often appears with: counsel and advisers to rulers · crime and punishment · justice as a virtue · forms of government · political legitimacy and consent · conspiracy and assassination · faction, party, and civil strife · conquest, plunder, and captives · public finance and debt · censorship and the press · elections and representation · diplomacy and embassies

Usually: indignation (296) · argument (262) · narrative (235) · censure (188) · injustice endured (178) · skepticism (161) · detachment (150) · betrayal (77) · ambition and its cost (59) · reflection (50)

Quotable
“This is the penalty of telling the truth, of telling the simple truth, in answer to a series of plain questions.” Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an Amer · insight
“It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems.” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion · observation
“A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · observation
“There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of OBTAINING, by MERITING, a continuance of them.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · insight
“A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · insight
“And fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.” Plato, The Republic · observation
“that, whenever the public measures he propos'd should appear to be for the good of the people, no one should espouse and forward them more zealously than myself” Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin · precept
“Immediately pass laws entitling black men to all civil, political and social privileges,” was the instant reply—and the questioning ceased.” Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom · wit
“Yet, let but his own temper be stirred, his own passions get loose, and the slave-owner will go far beyond the overseer in cruelty.” Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom · observation
“Of such weapons the greatest, perhaps, in the modern world is the power of the ballot; and this brings me to a consideration of the third form of contact between whites and blacks in the South,—political activity.” W. E. B. Du Bois (William Edward Burghardt Du Bois), The Souls of Black Folk · precept
“How often,” was he accustomed to say, “is it the interest of four or five ministers to combine together to deceive their sovereign! Secluded from mankind by his exalted dignity, the truth is concealed from his knowledge; he can see only with their eyes, he hears nothing but their misrepresentations.” Edward Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire · insight
“A censor may maintain, he can never restore, the morals of a state.” Edward Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire · insight

The Koran (Al-Qur'an) secondary

G. Margoliouth (George) · 610-632 CE (revelations compiled progressively; book published after the prophet’s death)
(6/15)

The preface explains that Qur’an chapter order in manuscripts is non-chronological, that early successors Abu Bakr and Zaid compiled fragments after Muhammad’s death, and that Uthman later standardized the text by burning other copies.

PREFACE It is necessary that some brief explanation should be given with reference to the arrangement of the Suras, or chapters, adopted in this translation of the Koran. It should be premised that their order as it stands in all Arabic manuscripts, and in all hitherto printed editions, whether Arabic or European, is not chronological, neither is there any authentic tradition to shew that it rests upon the authority…

The Koran (Al-Qur'an) secondary

G. Margoliouth (George) · 610-632 CE (revelations compiled progressively; book published after the prophet’s death)
Book carefully concocted from various sources, and with much extraneous aid, and published as a divine oracle, then it would seem that the author is at once open to the charge of the grossest imposture, and even of impious blasphemy. The evidence rather shews, that in all he did and wrote, Muhammad was actuated by a sincere desire to deliver his countrymen from the grossness of its debasing idolatries-that he was urged on by an intense desire to proclaim that great truth of the Unity of the Godhead which had taken full possession of his own soul-that the end to be attained justified to his mind the means he adopted in the production of his Suras-that he worked himself up into a belief that he had received a divine call-and that he was carried on by the force of circumstances, and by gradually increasing successes, to believe himself the accredited messenger of Heaven. The earnestness of those convictions which at Mecca sustained him under persecution, and which perhaps led him, at any price as it were, and by any means, not even excluding deceit and falsehood, to endeavour to rescue his countrymen from idolatry,-naturally stiffened at Medina into tyranny and unscrupulous violence. At the same time, he was probably, more or less, throughout his whole career, the victim of a certain amount of self-deception. A cataleptic13 subject from his early youth, born-according to the traditions-of a highly nervous and excitable mother, he would be peculiarly liable to morbid and fantastic hallucinations, and alternations of excitement and depression, which would win for him, in the eyes of his ignorant countrymen, the credit of being inspired. It would be easy for him to persuade himself that he was "the seal of the Prophets," > Book had believed, it had surely been better for them! Believers there are among them, but most of them are perverse. (54/73)

The text proceeds with “immunity” verses condemning hypocrites, regulating almsgiving categories, warning against defaming the Prophet, and describing disbelief, mockery, and future judgment, including disputes over alms and repeated forgiveness refusals.

votaries of other gods with God, witnesses against themselves of infidelity, to visit the temples of God. These! vain their works: and in the fire shall they abide for ever! He only should visit the temples of God who believeth in God and the last day, and observeth prayer, and payeth the legal alms, and dreadeth none but God. These haply will be among the rightly guided. Do ye place the giving drink to the pilgrim…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
(15/68)

Downing informs Pepys he has secured him a clerkship in the Council, Pepys hears other Council clerks are dismissed, and he notes that the Council’s offices and connections remain uncertain.

I hear are all turned out, only the two Leighs, and they do all tell me that my name was mentioned last night, but that nothing was done in it. 20th. In the morning I met Lord Widdrington in the street, [Sir Thomas Widdrington, Knight, Serjeant-at-Law. one of Cromwell's Commissioners of the Treasury, appointed Speaker 1656, and first Commissioner for the Great Seal, January, 1659; he was M.P. for York.] going to s…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
(65/68)

With rain ruining the King’s City spectacle, Pepys walks through Whitehall, meets court secretaries, visits the Admiralty and Park, and ends the day in despair when he hears Barlow is in town.

that we hope to have. My patent has cost me a great deal of money; about 40l. In the afternoon to Henry the Seventh's Chapel, where I heard a Sermon. 17th. This morning (as indeed all the mornings now-a-days) much business at my Lord's. There come to my house before I went out Mr. Barlow, an old consumptive man, and fair conditioned. After much talk, I did grant, him what he asked, viz. 50l. per annum, if my sala…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for Uniformity is lately printed, which, it is thought, will make mad work among the Presbyterian ministers. People of all sides are very much discontented; some thinking themselves used, contrary to promise, too hardly; and the other, that they are not rewarded so much as they expected by the King. (2/19)

Pepys witnesses the Navy office’s work under Coventry, including talk of Sir Henry Vane’s guilty verdict; he also observes office infighting over victualling accounts and claims over who should pay, ending in anger.

Sir George claiming it to be his place to save his three-pences. It ended in anger, and I believe will come to be a question before the King and Council. 13th. Up by 4 o'clock in the morning, and read Cicero's Second Oration against Cataline, which pleased me exceedingly: and more I discern therein than ever I thought was to be found in him; but I perceive it was my ignorance, and that he is as good a writer as ev…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for Uniformity is lately printed, which, it is thought, will make mad work among the Presbyterian ministers. People of all sides are very much discontented; some thinking themselves used, contrary to promise, too hardly; and the other, that they are not rewarded so much as they expected by the King. (11/19)

Pepys continues mid-August business and observes religious policy changes, including a ‘cheat’ by flag-makers, visits to the Palace of boats and the Tower area, and a crowded Farewell sermon by Dr. Bates against persecution.

by his coach towards White Hall; but there being a stop at the Savoy, we light and took water, and my Lord Sandwich being out of towne, we parted there. 10th. I walked to St. Dunstan's, the church being now finished; and here I heard Dr. Bates, [Dr. Bates, a celebrated Nonconformist divine.] who made a most eloquent sermon; and I am sorry I have hitherto had so low an opinion of the man, for I have not heard a nea…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act of Parliament commands, is the greatest piece of state now in discourse. But for ought I see they are gone out very peaceably, and the people not so much concerned therein as was expected. (8/38)

Pepys notes political talk in Parliament, then focuses on meetings around Whitehall and the Duke’s household: hunting plans, court scandals (Castlemaine pregnant; Chesterfield’s love affair), and a renewed search in the Tower cellar.

away, without the help of this man, before he died. But he is resolved to go to the party once more, and then to determine what we shall do further. 3rd. To White Hall, to the Duke's; but found him gone a-hunting. Thence to my Lord Sandwich, from whom I receive every day more and more signs of his confidence and esteem of me. Here I met with Pierce the chyrurgeon, who tells me that my Lady Castlemaine is with chil…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act of Parliament commands, is the greatest piece of state now in discourse. But for ought I see they are gone out very peaceably, and the people not so much concerned therein as was expected. (26/38)

On 17th Pepys hears a secret quarrel between Lord Sandwich and Edward Montagu about embassy money and abuses, then proceeds to 18th–19th Parliament business, royal speeches on religious toleration, and office-related imprisonment worries.

says the same for the Papists, but declares against their ever being admitted to have any offices or places of trust in the kingdom; but, God knows, too many have. 21st. To the office, where Sir J. Minnes (most of the rest being at the Parliament-house,) all the morning answering petitions and other business. Towards noon there comes a man as if upon ordinary business, and shows me a writ from the Exchequer, calle…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (22/495)

Pepys reflects on court appointments and patronage affecting Dr. Pierce, discusses accusations of bribery and naval administration, and reports Sir William Petty’s sailing wager between Dublin and Holyhead, concluding with his admiration for Mr. Coventry.

a famous runner. And Lee hath beat him; though the King and Duke of York and all men almost did bet three or four to one upon the tyler's head. 31st. To the Exchange, where I met Dr. Pierce, who tells me of his good luck to get to be groom of the Privy-Chamber to the Queene, and without my Lord Sandwich's help, but only by his good fortune, meeting a man that hath let him have his right for a small matter, about 60…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (28/495)

Pepys watches Tangier Committee plans for building the Mole at Tangier, notes objections being muted in examination of Teviott’s accounts, then reports a messenger asking whether the King will go to Newmarket and how fees-selling disputes are debated with the Duke.

1663. My Lord Sandwich sent a messenger to know whether the King intends to come to Newmarket, as is talked, that he may be ready to entertain him at Hinchingbroke. 12th. At St. James's we attended the Duke all of us. And there, after my discourse, Mr. Coventry of his own accord begun to tell the Duke how he found that discourse abroad did run to his prejudice about the fees that he took, and how he sold places an…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (29/495)

At St. James’s Pepys describes a heated exchange where Coventry and Sir G. Carteret dispute fees and selling offices, then Pepys learns about the King’s caution against disturbance and accompanies his wife to a synagogue, reacting sharply to perceived disorder.

below stayres in the Court, which he presently named, and it was Sir George Lane. [One of the Clerks of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Marquis of Ormond.] 13th. I find at Court, that either the King is doubtful of some disturbance, or else would seem so, (and I have reason to hope it is no worse,) by his commanding little commanders of castles, &c. to repair to their charges; and mustering the Guards the ot…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (34/495)

Pepys records court politics around Edward Montagu’s renewed respect for Lord Sandwich, describes conflicts over Mrs. Stewart’s appointment, and comments on the Duke of York’s improvement in business.

it when the Parliament comes to sit. My Lord tells me that he observes the Duke of York do follow and understand business very well, and is mightily improved thereby. 8th. To church, where I found that my coming in a perriwigg did not prove so strange as I was afraid it would, for I thought that all the church would presently have cast their eyes all upon me.

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (35/495)

Pepys discusses court looseness, religion and clergy arrogance with Mr. Blackburne, assesses the political influence of religious liberty, and weighs views on Monk and the former army.

to whom the King, he says, is still kind, so as now and then he goes to her as he believes; but with no such fondness as he used to do. But yet it is thought that this new wench is so subtle, that it is verily thought if the Queene had died, he would have married her. Mr. Blackburne and I fell to talk of many things, wherein he was very open to me: first, in that of religion, he makes it greater matter of prudence fo…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (35/495)

A long conversation continues on military discipline, public mismanagement of revenue, and the Navy’s leadership, including accusations and reputations around Sir William Penn and related political-religious figures.

and did desire me to observe it to my Lord Sandwich, among other things, that of all the old army now you cannot see a man begging about the streets; but what? You shall have this captain turned a shoemaker; the lieutenant, a baker; this a brewer; that a haberdasher; this common soldier, a porter; and every man in his apron and frock, &c., as if they had never done anything else: whereas the other go with their belts…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (51/495)

Pepys records a detailed discussion of English and foreign revenues with Sir Philip Warwick, evaluates taxation and parliamentary grants, then continues with March 1663-64 council complaints and the growing political fight against the Lord Chancellor.

with the Lieutenant in his pew, in great state. None, it seems, of the prisoners in the Tower that are there now, though they may, will come to prayers there. 29th. To Sir Philip Warwick, who showed me many excellent collections of the state of the Revenue in former Kings' and the late times, and the present. He showed me how the very assessments between 1643 and 1659, which were taxes, (besides Excise, Customes, …

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (59/495)

A Tangier committee reads poorly understood Peterborough’s accounts; Pepys also reports Edward Montagu’s removal from court due to pride and alleged intimacy with the Queen, then notes the King traveling to Chatham.

office of keeping the Records; but that he never comes thither, nor had been there these six months: so that I perceive they expect to get his employment from him. 19th, To a Committee of Tangier; where God forgive how our Report of my Lord Peterborough's accounts was read over and agreed to by the Lords, without one of them understanding it! And had it been what it would, it had gone: and, besides, not one thing …

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (176/495)

Pepys notes Sir W. Pen’s reluctance to offend Lord Brouncker, then attends the King at White Hall amid complaints from generals about fleet victualling and fire-ships; he also discusses political factions, pardons, and legal reversals.

Sir W. Pen, who is the most fit, is unwilling to displease him, and do not look after it; and so the King's work is like to be well done. 26th. I was a little disturbed with news my Lord Brouncker brought me, that we are to attend the King at White Hall this afternoon, and that it is about a complaint from the Generalls against us. Sir W. Pen and I by coach to White Hall, and there staid till the King and Cabinet …

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (195/495)

Pepys describes court corruption rumours (amours and intrigue), Parliament’s major debate on raising 1,800,000l. including replacing chimney-money, and the King’s insistence on a new vest fashion.

happen to hinder his doing the like service the next trial; which makes me think that it were not a thing very unfit; but I will not move in it. 15th. Colvill tells me of the viciousness of the Court; the contempt the King brings himself into thereby; his minding nothing, but doing all things just as his people about him will have it! The Duke of York becoming a slave to this Lady Denham, and wholly minds her. Th…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (252/495)

Pepys visits Whitehall, hears about the Duchess of Newcastle’s dramatic, romantic style and missing a scheduled court appearance, then records a heated dispute between Sir G. Carteret and Sir W. Coventry over money.

himself to some other place. This was strange to me. Our Commissioners are preparing to go to Bredah to the treaty, and do design to be going the next week. 11th. To White Hall, thinking there to have seen the Duchesse of Newcastle's coming this night to Court to make a visit to the Queene, the King having been with her yesterday to make her a visit since her coming to town. The whole story of this lady is a roman…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (262/495)

During Holy Thursday Pepys dines with parishioners, learns the Lord Treasurer has just died, discusses management worries, and recounts an extraordinary bribery and release dispute involving Samuel Moyer.

the Treasury shall be managed by Commission. I would to God Sir G. Carteret, or my Lord Sandwich, be in it! But the latter is the more fit for it. 16th. This being Holy Thursday, when the boys go our procession round the parish, we were to go to the Three Tuns Tavern to dine with the rest of the parish; where all the parish almost was, Sir Andrew Rickard and others; and of our house, J. Minnes, W. Batten, W. Pen, a…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (275/495)

On 14th, Pepys records factional blame at Council, vandalism against the Lord Chancellor with a Dunkirk/Tangier/Todent-saying placard, rumors of cash in the Exchequer, unrest and treason talk, and talk of Albemarle’s appointment as Lord High Constable.

Gauden did tell me yesterday, that the day before at the Council they were ready to fall together by the ears at the Council-table, arraigning one another of being guilty of the counsel that brought us into this misery, by laying up all the great ships. Mr. Hater tells me at noon that some rude people have been, as he hears, at my Lord Chancellor's, where they have cut down the trees before his house and broke his wi…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (290/495)

On July 17 Pepys declines a private offer of prize money, rejoices at a Canary prize brought to Hull, and notes Buckingham’s strange release, framing it as more “fool’s play” in public affairs.

for a day to this place, and then quit to another place; and there is more variety and as little charge, and no trouble, as there is in a country-house. 17th. Home, where I was saluted with the news of Hogg's bringing a rich Canary prize to Hull: and Sir W. Batten do offer me 1000l. down for my particular share, beside Sir Richard Ford's part; which do tempt me; but yet I would not take it;, but will stand and fal…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (297/495)

Pepys continues the Bellasses-Porter duel narrative and then comments on appointments around Lady Castlemaine—especially a drunken Glenham rumor—and observes political consequences, hypocrisy, and Castlemaine’s court intrigues.

Taylor since the last sitting of Parliament as would hang him, if there were nothing else, would the King do what were fit for him; but nothing of that is now likely to be. Cozen Roger and Creed to dinner with me, and very merry: but among other things they told me of the strange, bold sermon of Dr. Creeton [Probably Robert Creyghton of Trin. Col. Cambridge, A.M. 1662. Ling. Graec. Prof. Reg. 1672-3.] yesterday befo…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (309/495)

Pepys records the court’s talk that Lady Castlemaine is seeking a pension and leaving court, while a Council act targets Papists in office, alongside other news and explanations of political and domestic favors.

in such a case; thinking myself now in the best place that ever man was in to please his own mind in, and therefore I will take to preserve it. 3rd. Attended the Duke of York about the list of ships that we propose to sell: and here there attended Mr. Wren the first time, who hath not yet, I think, received the Duke of York's seal and papers. At our coming hither we found the Duke and Duchesse all alone at dinner…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (315/495)

Pepys dines at Lord Ashley’s, debates House of Lords’ legal authority, observes court talk and spectacle, reviews Navy/East India prize accounts, and hears how the King and Duke of York acted drunkenly while hunting.

before, since I came to be a person concerned in business; and I doubt, when I come to make up my accounts, I shall find it so by the expence. 23rd. At my Lord Ashly's by invitation to dine there. At table it is worth remembering that my Lord tells us that the House of Lords is the last appeal that a man can make upon a point of interpretation of the law, and that therein they are above the Judges; and that he did…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (323/495)

Pepys secures approval from the Duke of York for his requested ship, hears news that Parliament may seek revenge on the chancellor through suspected parliamentary designs and alleged money-taking bargains, and visits Wren about his warrant.

there is but 800l. found in the world of money; and is in great doubt what we shall do towards the doing ourselves right with them, about the prize money. 13th. To St. James's; and there to the Duke of York's chamber and there he was dressing; and many Lords and Parliament-men come to kiss his hands, they being newly come to town. And then the Duke of York did of himself call me to him and tell me that he had spok…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (329/495)

On 25th Pepys prepares Parliament’s response to defend the Navy office and reports that Ordnance commissioners are blamed, while impeachment talk spreads toward Mordaunt and the Chancellor.

I can; and am in great fear of nothing but the damned business of the prizes, but I fear my Lord will receive a cursed deal of trouble by it. 25th. Up, and to make our answer ready for the Parliament this afternoon, to show how Commissioner Pett was singly concerned in the execution of all orders at Chatham, and that we did properly lodge all orders with him. Thence with Sir W. Pen to the Parliament Committee, and…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (339/495)

Pepys recounts Commons votes that Lords’ Clarendon proceedings obstruct justice, and describes the Gilsthrop inquiry into Navy fraud, Sir W. Coventry’s advice to speak little, and Clarendon’s sudden flight.

of the Commons this afternoon, that the proceedings of the Lords in the case of my Lord Clarendon are an obstruction to justice, and of ill precedent to future times. 3rd. To Sir W. Coventry's, the first time I have seen him at his new house since he came to lodge there. He tells me of the vote for none of the House to be of the Commission for the Bill of Accounts; which he thinks is so great a disappointment to B…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (362/495)

Pepys hears Coventry’s complaints about court enemies, reduced charges in Ireland, and then notes he has learned a cousin was made marshal to Lord Coke, showing how careers have fallen and risen.

was Marshall to my Lord Coke when he was Lord Chief Justice; which beginning of his I did not know to be so low; but so it was, it seems. 31st. Up; and by coach, with W. Griffin with me, and our Contract-books, to Durham Yard, to the Commissioners for Accounts; the first time I ever was there; and staid awhile before I was admitted to them. I did observe a great many people attending about complaints of seamen con…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (420/495)

Pepys corrects and submits the Duke of York’s signed version of his report, navigates anxieties that he may be blamed for it, debates office security with Wren and Cocke, and meets the Duke of York’s commissioners about prizes.

here danced all night long, with a noble supper; and about two in the morning the table spread again for a noble breakfast beyond all moderation; and then broke up. 27th. To St. James's; and there with Mr. Wren did correct his copy of my letter, which the Duke of York hath signed in my very words, without alteration of a syllable. And so, pleased therewith, I to my Lord Brouncker, who I find within, but hath busin…

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (434/495)

Pepys arranges a coach and coachman, then discusses with the Duke of York his reforming anxieties regarding the Admiralty and the Navy’s critics, alongside concern about personal correspondence and future justification.

for 53l. and to stand to the courtesy of what more I should give him upon the finishing of it. He is likely also to fit me with a coachman. 26th. I was obliged to attend the Duke of York, thinking to have had a meeting of Tangier to-day but had not: but he did take me and Mr. Wren into his closet, and there did press me to prepare what I had to say upon the answers of my fellow-officers to his great letter; which …

The Diary of Samuel Pepys primary

Samuel Pepys · 1659-01-01 to 1669 (diary entries)
Act of Indemnity; and in the House of Commons, between the > Act for the rendering none capable of preferment or employment in the State, but who have been loyall and constant to the King and (471/495)

Pepys learns Sir William Coventry has been released and observes Buckingham’s influence in removing Dr. Wren; he hears plans about Tangier, worries about ongoing war finances, and records strained court treatment of Saville and the King.

which do put me in some hopes that there may be in this absence some accommodation made between the Duke of York and the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Arlington. 21st. To White Hall, in a scull; where to the Duke of York's dressing-room, and there met Harry Saville, and do understand that Sir W. Coventry is come to his house last night. I understand by Mr. Wren that his friends having by Secretary Trevor and my Lord…

The History of the Peloponnesian War primary

Thucydides · Composed beginning at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (traditionally 431 BCE); continued thereafter (Book I–VIII survive; work unfinished).
BOOK I > CHAPTER XIII (10/13)

The Sicilians heed Hermocrates and conclude peace, then at Athens the generals involved are punished for alleged bribery; in the same summer, Megarians attempt a betrayal plan to admit Athenians into Nisaea.

possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities of the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every year with all their forces, and harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at Pegae, who h…

The Souls of Black Folk primary

W. E. B. Du Bois (William Edward Burghardt Du Bois) · 1903
(84/130)

He acknowledges a growing class of Black landlords and mechanics, but says exploitation persists because the successful class lacks planned selection and because white prejudice blocks Black leadership, so Du Bois demands trained Black leaders and power.

not feel in duty bound to protect and train and care for the weaker members of their group, they leave them to be preyed upon by these swindlers and rascals. This unfortunate economic situation does not mean the hindrance of all advance in the black South, or the absence of a class of black landlords and mechanics who, in spite of disadvantages, are accumulating property and making good citizens. But it does mean th…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXIII. (3/48)

Calavius then rules Capua without arms by making senators dependent on his favor, turning senate business into a popular assembly and increasing contempt for Roman authority after Cannae.

his honour, he went out; and having ordered the house to be closed, placed a guard in the lobby that no one might enter or leave it without his leave. 3. Then assembling the people, he thus addressed them: "What you have so often wished for, Campanians, the power of punishing an unprincipled and detestable senate, you now have, not at your own imminent peril, by riotously storming the houses of each, which are guard…

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 secondary

Titus Livius (Livy) · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (for Ab urbe condita; individual books composed within this span)
BOOK IX. > BOOK XXV. (34/42)

Scipio halts with his share of troops near Anitorgis, but Celtiberian auxiliaries defect after Hasdrubal bribes their leaders; Scipio retreats cautiously from level ground, while the enemy crosses the river to pursue him.

of the enemy, the river only separating them. Here Cneius Scipio, with the forces above mentioned, halted, but Publius Scipio proceeded to the portion of the war assigned to him. 33. Hasdrubal perceiving that there were but few Roman troops in the camp, and that their whole dependence was on the Celtiberian auxiliaries; and having had experience of the perfidy of the barbarian nations in general, and particularly of…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
(35/52)

The senate chooses Caius Claudius Nero and secures Marcus Livius for consul despite Livius’s long exile after disgrace, recounting Senate deliberations, public opposition, and the political reconciliation that follows.

engage the enemy, but the immortal gods, in pity to the Roman name, had spared the unoffending armies, and doomed the consuls to expiate their temerity with their own lives. 34. On the fathers' looking round to see whom they should appoint as consuls, Caius Claudius Nero appeared pre-eminently. They then looked out for a colleague for him, and although they considered him a man of the highest talents, they also were…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXVIII. (25/47)

Scipio’s illness causes exaggerated rumors that destabilize allied Spain and trigger mutiny at Sucro; Mandonius and Indibilis recruit Celtiberians, while soldiers demand pay and defy tribunes.

Laelius were sent thither, the former with the light cohorts, the latter with seven triremes and one quinquereme, in order that they might act in concert by land and sea. 24. In consequence of Scipio's being afflicted with a severe fit of illness, which rumour represented as more serious than it really was; for every one made some addition to the account he had received, from a desire inherent in mankind of intentio…

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 secondary

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)
BOOK XXVII. > BOOK XXXVI. (12/38)

In spring Antiochus moves through Phocis to Chaeronea, sacrifices at Delphi, then heads to Naupactum and into Aetolia; bribed Acarnanian leaders and praetor Clytus plan hostages at Medio and Thurium to weaken Roman influence.

placed three hundred in garrison at Medio, and two hundred at Thurium, with the design that they should fall into the hands of the king, and serve hereafter as hostages. 12. At this time, ambassadors from the king came to Medio, whose proposal being heard, the assembly began to consider what answer should be returned to the king; when some advised to adhere to the alliance with Rome, and others, not to reject the fr…

Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave primary

Frederick Douglass · 1845
LETTER FROM WENDELL PHILLIPS, ESQ. > CHAPTER III (3/3)

Douglass recounts Colonel Lloyd’s wealth of slaves and the truth-telling questions that lead an enslaved man to be sold after criticizing Lloyd, then explains how slavery encourages “contented” answers and quarrels between enslaved people over masters.

one of the house-servants stand off from him a suitable distance to be touched with the end of his whip, and at every stroke raise great ridges upon his back. To describe the wealth of Colonel Lloyd would be almost equal to describing the riches of Job. He kept from ten to fifteen house-servants. He was said to own a thousand slaves, and I think this estimate quite within the truth. Colonel Lloyd owned so many that …

Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave primary

Frederick Douglass · 1845
LETTER FROM WENDELL PHILLIPS, ESQ. > CHAPTER IX (4/4)

Douglass contrasts his prior differences with Master Thomas, who leases him to Edward Covey, a notorious “slave-breaker” Methodist whose reputation helps him profit from whippings.

out her helpless child, to starve and die! Master Thomas was one of the many pious slaveholders who hold slaves for the very charitable purpose of taking care of them. My master and myself had quite a number of differences. He found me unsuitable to his purpose. My city life, he said, had had a very pernicious effect upon me. It had almost ruined me for every good purpose, and fitted me for every thing which was bad…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(134/342)

Hamilton further rebuts fears about internal taxation causing double burdens or undue influence by proposing reciprocal forbearance and using state officials and regulations where possible to reduce costs and resentment.

events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan. As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest the councils…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(189/342)

Madison claims legislative power grows because it masks encroachments, accesses public money, and gains influence over other departments; he supports this with Virginia’s experience as described by Thomas Jefferson and Pennsylvania’s Council of Censors.

government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person sho…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(209/342)

Hamilton continues by contrasting the Revolution-era Congress with a feared-capture future, then argues that dangers from other federal branches are limited by officeholding rules and the logic of responsible republican checks.

appointed from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still longer term. They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(214/342)

Hamilton argues that the objection’s deeper claim—that people cannot choose trustworthy rulers—undermines republican government; he compares federal elections to state elections and challenges the logic as both unreasonable and unsupported by facts.

of Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(216/342)

Madison argues that state-level election practices—where cities, counties, and whole-state constituencies choose officials—have not increased corruption, so diffusive election methods do not inherently elevate traitors or undermine liberty.

as will be necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose; and those of New York still more so. In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five representativ…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(235/342)

The author replies that a Senate cannot easily become tyrannical because it would have to corrupt itself, corrupt state legislatures, corrupt the House, and corrupt the people, then cites Maryland and Britain to argue the fears are exaggerated.

as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given. Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(240/342)

Hamilton argues that senators’ equal representation and the president and Senate’s shared responsibility make treaty-making reliable, and that any corrupt conduct would be improbable and treaties obtained by fraud would be void under international law.

made sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties? As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while th…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(246/342)

Hamilton argues that accusations of the Senate becoming too aristocratic are too vague to measure, and he lists counterweights from the House—exclusive money bills, originating impeachments, and choosing among presidential electors.

of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the Government. But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities to b…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(258/342)

He compares the President’s appointment power with the British king’s and the New York governor’s appointment council, arguing the small New York council is more influenceable than the national Senate process.

a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor. The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appoint…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(271/342)

He claims multiplying executive power into a council cannot achieve security because numbers enable combinations and dangerous influence, while a single executive is more closely watched and harder to cloak wrongdoing.

should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than o…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(276/342)

He rejects excluding the chief magistrate after a fixed time (temporary or perpetual), arguing it would reduce incentives for duty, encourage corruption and usurpation, deprive the public of experienced leadership, and destabilize administration.

limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary. One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the st…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(278/342)

In Federalist No. 73, Hamilton says executive energy requires secure support: if the legislature controls presidential pay, it can coerce or seduce him, so compensation must be fixed for the presidential term.

always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious object, the observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other. What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st, greater independence in the magistrate; 2d, greater security to the people. Unless the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no pretense to infe…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(286/342)

He rejects giving treaty power only to an hereditary monarch or only to an elective President or only to the Senate, warning about corruption or loss of confidence abroad, and claims joint possession best secures the public.

the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them. However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of fo…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(290/342)

The author argues that presidential nomination paired with Senate approval is better than presidential appointment alone because nomination limits party bargaining and reduces unmerited choices for office.

usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations. The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend that the President ought solely to have been …

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(292/342)

Answering objections that the executive could bribe Senate members into compliant approvals, the author claims Senators possess probity and constitutional restraints that make broad corruption impracticable.

belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure. To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. This supposition of universal venalty in human nature is little less an e…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(295/342)

The author attacks New York’s council of appointment system as a secret, small conclave that enables cabal and intrigue, resulting in improper appointments and loss of accountability.

of the Executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace. The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment in this State. The council of appointment consists of from three to five persons, of whom the governor is always one. This small body, shut up in a private apa…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(296/342)

He considers (and largely rejects) a proposal to give the House of Representatives appointment power, arguing that a large, fluctuating body would cause instability, delays, and excessive patronage.

a diminution of the security against an undue influence of the Executive. And yet such a council has been warmly contended for as an essential amendment in the proposed Constitution. I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the subject of appointments without taking notice of a scheme for which there have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House of Representatives in th…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(323/342)

Hamilton discusses civil-jury trial’s role as a check on corruption, then explains why federal constitutional adoption is hard because states differ in courts and jury practices, increasing the practical obstacles.

and every species of official extortion, are offenses against the government, for which the persons who commit them may be indicted and punished according to the circumstances of the case. The excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases appears to depend on circumstances foreign to the preservation of liberty. The strongest argument in its favor is, that it is a security against corruption. As there is always mor…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-1788
(8/338)

Jay argues that an efficient national government better prevents war by ensuring consistent treaty interpretation, appointing capable officials, and limiting state-level bad faith or local temptations.

The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended. Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having l…