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Virtue and happiness

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Often appears with: justice as a virtue · epicurean ethics · the passions and the emotions · supreme vs perfect good · summing up moral outcomes · stoic views of virtue · stoic ethics · pleasure, pain, and the good life · moral self-consciousness · moral psychology · duty, conscience, and obligation

Usually: argument (2) · curiosity (1) · detachment (1) · skepticism (1) · wonder (1)

Quotable
“Respect, not pleasure or enjoyment of happiness, is something for which it is not possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its foundation” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason · precept

The Critique of Practical Reason secondary

Immanuel Kant · 1788
BOOK*1|CHAPTER*1 > CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the (1/40)

Kant distinguishes the supreme good (supremum) from the perfect good (consummatum), arguing that virtue is the supreme good while happiness completes the perfect good, and he reviews Epicurean and Stoic models of their unity.

Conception of the "Summum Bonum". The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The summum may mean either the supreme (supremum) or the perfect (consummatum). The former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e., is not subordinate to any other (originarium); the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of …

The Critique of Practical Reason secondary

Immanuel Kant · 1788
BOOK*1|CHAPTER*1 > CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the (6/40)

Kant examines why philosophers claim virtue brings happiness, focusing on Epicurus and the Stoics, and explains the problem of making virtue possible without prior moral feeling or consciousness of integrity.

moral worth of his existence so highly, by praising to him the peace of mind that would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has no sense? On the other hand, however, there is here an occasion of a vitium subreptionis, and as it were of an optical illusion, in the self-consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one feels- an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altoget…