HKB
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Often appears with: fate, destiny, and necessity · will, choice, and freedom · the nature and attributes of God · the problem of evil and theodicy · universal ordering · theoretical vs practical reason · rational perception · postulation of a supreme being · perception and the senses · morality and theology · moral necessity · mind regards things as present
Usually: detachment (7) · argument (6) · skepticism (3) · reflection (2) · sudden reversal of fortune (2)
“It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly, namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves—that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.” Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethics — Part 2 · insight
“Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) · observation
“Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) · insight
He distinguishes theoretical cognition (what is) from practical cognition (what ought to happen), arguing morality postulates a Supreme Being, while speculative theoretical cognition cannot derive an absolutely necessary cause from experience.
the theist in a living God (summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all these attempts of reason to establish the existence of a Supreme Being. It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or cognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical employment of reason is that by which…
Aquinas develops objections about necessity and conditional statements by distinguishing necessity in the thing versus in the proposition as present to God, emphasizing eternity’s above-time perspective.
first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; …
Aquinas argues God’s will does not impose absolute necessity on all things: some are necessary and some contingent according to how God prepares causes, so effects follow necessarily or contingently in the manner God wills.
The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent. This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by defici…
It answers that divine providence is unchangeable and certain only in the sense that foreseen events occur as foreseen, whether they arise by necessity or by contingency.
Reply Obj. 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency. Reply Obj. 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of t…
In the sixth article, Thomas argues that heavenly bodies do not impose necessity on all their effects: even when they incline causes, outcomes can be hindered—especially by free will—so not everything happens deterministically.
the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the m…
Leibniz develops a distinction between infallible certainty and necessity, insisting grace is always resistible even though it is infallibly certain to win in cases where it triumphs.
*resistible*, even in those most holy, and that *freedom* is exempt not only from *constraint* but also from *necessity*, although it be never without infallible *certainty* or without inclining *determination*. 281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be permitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the *power* to do good is often lacking, even in the just; that sins are often *necess…
He says confusion about necessity and contingency arises from ambiguous terms; if necessity is metaphysical consistency and moral necessity guides the best, then the labyrinth of disputes clears.
Most of the ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son, who was then a minor, and they suspected M. de Witt and what was called the Lowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and other sects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populace against them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thus very natural that M. de la Cour should publish this b…
Reason, unlike imagination, treats things as necessary rather than contingent, explaining that humans imagine future or past states as contingent due to how the mind and body track present sensations and memories over time.
truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary. >>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, …