HKB
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Often appears with: the problem of evil and theodicy · will, choice, and freedom · the nature and attributes of God · providence and divine governance · justice as a virtue · freedom and necessity · fate, destiny, and necessity · summum bonum · subjective vs objective necessity · pure rational faith · postulate of god · permitting evil
Usually: argument (7) · detachment (6) · skepticism (2) · crisis of belief (1) · injustice endured (1)
“But when it is a crime, God can only will the permission of it: the crime is neither an end nor a means, it is only a *conditio sine qua non*; thus it is not the object of a direct will.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von, Theodicy · insight
Kant argues that assuming God’s existence is morally necessary for realizing the summum bonum, though this necessity is subjective desire, not a duty to make a theoretical claim.
possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God. It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is subjective, that is, it is a want, and not objective, that is, itself a duty, for there cannot be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical emplo…
Leibniz argues that God’s love of virtue is limited only because the best overall order requires allowing vice, which enters the universe’s harmony to produce more total good.
raise its head, save that he punishes it finally after having long tolerated it, his affection for virtue is not the greatest one can conceive; it is therefore not infinite.' I am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims, and already I am weary of refuting, and making the same answer always. M. Bayle multiplies unnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas. If things connected together may be sep…
Leibniz argues that permitting evil is not indifference or wishing it; humans often tolerate evils for higher priorities, and God permits evils because they connect to the greatest possible goods.
127. XII. 'To permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care whether it be committed or not, or is even to wish that it be committed.' By no means. How many times do men permit evils which they could prevent if they turned all their efforts in that direction? But other more important cares prevent them from doing so. One will rarely resolve upon adjusting irregularities in the coinage while one is involved in…
He answers a maxim about free versus necessary causes: one may be morally responsible without being metaphysically ‘necessitated,’ since God prompts the best by moral necessity and choices involve hypothetical necessity.
not sufficiently the extent of the city of God, nor the form of the general republic of spirits, nor even the whole architecture of bodies, may produce the same effect. 134. XIX. 'Those physicians who chose, among many remedies capable of curing a sick man, whereof divers were such as they well knew he would take with enjoyment, precisely that one which they knew he would refuse to take, would vainly urge and pray h…
Leibniz discusses debates on why God permits moral evil, treating it as permissive decree rather than direct willing of crimes; he argues God is morally bound to permit evil when preventing it would violate divine duty to what is best.
in the original imperfection of creatures: that renders them capable of sinning, and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which cause this power to evince itself in action. 157. The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it is thought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but Scripture is not explicit enough on that point. The passage of the Apocalypse that speaks of the …
He says confusion about necessity and contingency arises from ambiguous terms; if necessity is metaphysical consistency and moral necessity guides the best, then the labyrinth of disputes clears.
Most of the ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son, who was then a minor, and they suspected M. de Witt and what was called the Lowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and other sects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populace against them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thus very natural that M. de la Cour should publish this b…
Leibniz answers Objection VIII by redefining freedom: God is fully free precisely because he always chooses the best, and the resulting “necessity” is moral rather than determinative of wrongdoing.
that a *need* is to take the term in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat as one does when speaking of the wrath of God. Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387] always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself: *semel jussit, semper paret*. But he had better have said, that God always commands and that he is always obeyed: for in w…