HKB
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Often appears with: reason and the intellect · fate, destiny, and necessity · doubt, skepticism, and certainty · logic, method, and demonstration · conversion and faith · perception and the senses · world as whole (finite or infinite) · wagering · transcendental ideality of phenomena · transcendent philosophy critique · the problem of evil and theodicy · the nature and attributes of God
Usually: argument (9) · skepticism (6) · crisis of belief (5) · exhortation (5) · detachment (4) · reflection (3) · temptation (1) · the fall of the great (1) · the test or trial (1) · censure (1)
“Therefore the world—the content of all phenomena—is not a whole existing in itself.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason · insight
“Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by war.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason · observation
“Scepticism is a resting place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason · insight
“Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) · insight
“Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) · insight
“But I reply, that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to all reason. For, as God alone is a sufficient witness of himself in his own word, so also the word will never gain credit in the hearts of men, till it be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit.” Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 1 of 2) · insight
“Therefore with him I waive discussion--who has set his head Even where his feet should be.” Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things · wit
“For unto each has been divided off Its function quite apart, its power to each; And thus we're still constrained to perceive The soft, the cold, the hot apart, apart All divers hues and whatso things there be Conjoined with hues.” Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things · observation
“The last proceeding of reason is to recognise that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it.” Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Pensées · insight
“We must know where to doubt, where to feel certain, where to submit. He who does not do so, understands not the force of reason.” Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Pensées · precept
“It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason.” Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Pensées · insight
Kant proposes a new “Copernican” method for metaphysics: instead of assuming cognition conforms to objects, assume objects conform to our cognition, enabling a priori knowledge of experience and clarifying the limits of reason.
does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition.[5] [5] This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of the *Chemists*, which they term the experiment of *reduction*, or, more usually, the *synthetic* process. The *analysis* of the metaphysician separates pure cognition *à priori* into two heterogeneou…
Kant denies that reason may evade these cosmological problems by saying the object is unknowable, because the object is only the absolute totality in thought, so failure must be traced to dialectic in the idea.
a question regarding the constitution of a something which cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely beyond the sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and void. It is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the questions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones domesticae), although, up to a c…
Kant argues the cosmological antinomy vanishes because its contradiction arises from treating the idea of absolute totality as applying to phenomena, then shows this yields an indirect proof that phenomena have transcendental ideality.
as a series of subordinate representations, it subsists only in the dynamical regress and cannot be regarded as existing previously to this regress, or as a self-subsistent series of things. Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears. For the above demonstration has established the fact that it is merely the product of a dialectical and illusory opposition, which arises from the applicatio…
Kant sets a regulative rule: seek empirical conditions within the sensuous world and do not infer existence from beyond the empirical series, while still allowing reason to posit a purely intelligible necessary ground.
in some sphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its way in the empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere of the transcendental. The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere representations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in themselves are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in…
Kant advises against coercing or manipulating reason through public agitation, saying thinkers should follow their own paths while critics remain tranquil spectators, because dialectical disputes should be governed by reason’s self-imposed limits.
abstract speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and within the sphere of pure ideas. What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural one. Let each thinker pu…
Kant likens uncriticized reason to Hobbes’s state of nature solved by war, while criticism functions like legal order and lasting peace through lawful adjudication of reason’s rights and limits.
which have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason. Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the fundamental laws of its own institution, secures…
He distinguishes dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism, saying skepticism is a temporary resting place that improves judgment, while criticism investigates reason’s powers to fix reason’s necessary and eternal limits.
establish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical. This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination, and, if necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles. But this…
Question 1, Article 1 argues that besides philosophy, revealed sacred doctrine is necessary because the human end in God surpasses reason and salvation requires truths disclosed by divine revelation.
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 2] Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science? Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2 Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. Obj. 2: Further, …
Calvin insists that Scripture’s proof lies in God’s divine speaking and must be sealed internally by the Holy Spirit; human reason can’t create the assurance essential to true piety.
an introduction, and be a proper beginning of inquiry, as he expresses himself; yet that we should not be satisfied with mere opinion, but rest upon certain and solid truth. IV. It must be maintained, as I have before asserted, that we are not established in the belief of the doctrine till we are indubitably persuaded that God is its Author. The principal proof, therefore, of the Scriptures is every where derived fr…
Pascal says Christians cannot give rational proofs for belief because reason cannot decide God’s existence, so people must confront an unavoidable wager under infinite stakes and finite human uncertainty.
knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who will dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have no affinity to Him. Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a foolishness, *stultitiam*;[90] and then you complain that the…
Pascal argues that faith is above the senses, warns against overconfident claims based on limited sight, and insists reason’s last step is admitting an infinity beyond it.
265 Faith indeed tells what the senses do not tell, but not the contrary of what they see. It is above them and not contrary to them. 266 How many stars have telescopes revealed to us which did not exist for our philosophers of old! We freely attack Holy Scripture on the great number of stars, saying, "There are only one thousand and twenty-eight,[103] we know it." There is grass on the earth, we see it--from the …
Lucretius argues that reason cannot successfully overturn the senses, because senses provide the origin of our notion of truth, without which reason itself is falsified.
feigning to see What by the senses are not seen at all. For naught is harder than to separate Plain facts from dubious, which the mind forthwith Adds by itself. Again, if one suppose That naught is known, he knows not whether this Itself is able to be known, since he Confesses naught to know. Therefore with him I waive discussion--who has set his head Even where his feet should be. But let m…