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Legislative usurpation

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Often appears with: separation of powers and checks · separation of powers · censorship and the press · tyranny and despotism · tyrannical concentration of power · revisionary check on legislation · public opinion and political passions · public finance and debt · public credit and fiscal stability · no complete separation · money, coin, and credit · insufficient written constitutional limits

Usually: argument (3) · skepticism (2) · detachment (1) · indignation (1)

Quotable
“The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in judgment.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · observation

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(188/342)

In Federalist No. 48, Madison argues that separation must include enough constitutional connection so each department can control the others; mere “parchment barriers” fail against encroachment, especially legislative usurpations.

they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers again…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(192/342)

Hamilton argues that when legislative party insiders judge constitutional disputes through conventions or similar bodies, public judgment is driven by passions and partisan influence, not the true merits of the constitutional question.

for a favorable issue. But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the people. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those le…

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2 primary

United States. Constitutional Convention · 1787-07-19 to 1787-09-17 (convention debates recorded; excerpts reflect entries in the official journal as presented here)
Act to which the States by their Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself. > act of the ordinary legislatures to be equally authentic, (19/65)

Arguments continue over how strong a negative and revisionary checks should be: concerns about paper money, legislative instability, the dangers of legislative usurpation, and eventual rejection or postponement of some forms of control.

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay. Mary^d ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. M^r Gov^r Morris regretted that something like the proposed check could not be agreed to. He dwelt on the importance of public Credit, and the difficulty of supporting it without some strong barrier against the instability of legislative Assemblies. He suggested the idea of requiring three fourths of each house …