HKB
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Often appears with: the nature and attributes of God · justice as a virtue · gratitude and ingratitude · equity, mercy, and pardon · will turning back · virtue caused by habituation · the problem of evil and theodicy · temperance and self-mastery · stain remains after sin · sin, guilt, and repentance · salvation conditions · remonstrants
Usually: detachment (5) · argument (4) · reflection (2) · exhortation (2) · commentary or gloss (1) · crisis of belief (1) · injustice endured (1) · reconciliation (1) · censure (1) · curiosity (1)
“Thus it is the result of all the inclinations together that makes his will complete and decretory, as I have already explained.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von, Theodicy · insight
“Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · observation
“Prayer presupposes a grace which it is not within our power to obtain.” Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Pensées · insight
In Q.50 Art.2 Thomas holds that habit can be in the soul with respect to its powers when ordered to operation, while grace is an example of habit in the soul’s essence by a higher nature.
*On the contrary,* The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul. *I answer that,* As we have said above (Q. 49, AA. 2, 3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human natur…
In the Second Article, Aquinas holds that virtuous habits can be caused by habituation when human acts follow human reason, but virtues that direct to the good defined by Divine Law are produced only by divine operation.
body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intel…
Aquinas teaches the stain of sin remains even after the act ends, because the will does not immediately return to God; only when grace moves the sinner back to divine light is the stain removed.
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another? (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? (4) Whether sin incurs a d…
Aquinas argues that anyone with grace has prudence, since grace entails charity and the connected virtues, while explaining that not all have the highest form of prudence due to differing diligence and acquired experience.
Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace. *On the contrary,* No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplis…
Pascal contrasts piety and goodness, warns against trusting only in God’s mercy without doing good works, and explains how grace and mercy combat pride and sloth.
502 Abraham[189] took nothing for himself, but only for his servants. So the righteous man takes for himself nothing of the world, nor the applause of the world, but only for his passions, which he uses as their master, saying to the one, "Go," and to another, "Come." _Sub te erit appetitus tuus._[190] The passions thus subdued are virtues. Even God attributes to Himself avarice, jealousy, anger; and these are virtu…
A translator explains a disputed fragment about prayer: God promises to answer requests, but humans lack the grace needed to ask rightly, so prayer presupposes grace.
Then God abandons the first in this sense. It is doubtful, however that this fragment should be included in the *Pensées*, and it has seemed best to separate it from the text. It has only once before appeared--in the edition of Michaut (1896). The first half of it has been freely translated in order to give an interpretation in accordance with a suggestion from M. Emile Boutro…
Shifting to predestination and grace, he contrasts natural theology with human appearances and outlines major parties’ views, stressing God’s independence and creatures’ dependence, and proposes reconciliation over God’s aims.
For a wise person in laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means; he does not contemplate any end without knowing if there are means of attaining thereto. 79. I know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine that, God being the absolute master of all things, one can thence infer that everything outside him is indifferent to him, that he considers himself alone, without concern for others, …