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Often appears with: justice as a virtue · pleasure, pain, and the good life · will, choice, and freedom · the passions and the emotions · pleasure and pain · the fear of death · temperance and self-mastery · stoic ethics · species of quality · sadness and pleasure · rights and liberties · reason and the intellect
Usually: argument (10) · detachment (5) · injustice endured (3) · exhortation (3) · skepticism (3) · the test or trial (2) · temptation (1) · censure (1) · reverence (1)
“Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call GOOD, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that EVIL which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 · insight
“Thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · observation
“What is it, then, to be educated? It is to learn to apply the natural conceptions to each thing severally according to nature.” Epictetus (trans. T. W. Rolleston), The Teaching of Epictetus · precept
“And if the evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · insight
“Life,” says the emperor, “is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after fame is oblivion” Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius · vivid
“It is not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never beginning to live according to nature (XII. 1).” Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius · precept
Locke defines pleasure and pain as basic ideas known by experience, then claims good and evil are only relative to pleasure and pain, which ground the passions like love.
OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 1. Pleasure and Pain, simple Ideas. AMONGST the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call i…
Locke argues that happiness alone moves desire, defining happiness and misery as the extremes of what we take as good or evil by their relation to pleasure and pain.
45. Why the greatest Good is not always desired. This, I think, any one may observe in himself and others,—That the greater visible good does not always raise men’s desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged, to have: though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pai…
It criticizes vague notions of justice by insisting on justice in action, then discusses Stoic judgments of good and evil, claiming many external things are morally indifferent for everyone.
the notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice in act. The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful and some ugly, and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or bad (II. 1). All these things, good and evil, are in our power, absolutely some of the stricter St…
Engels argues that moral ideas like good and evil vary by historical and class conditions, and that Dühring’s “mole-like scepticism” obscures ethical truth by treating morality as merely confused rhetoric.
own statements are merely accidental and confused, a kind of "mole-like scepticism" and "barren confusion," what is all the fuss about, and what useful purpose is served by Herr Duehring? If we gain no ground in the matter of truth and error we gain less in respect of good and evil. Here we have an antagonism of ethical significance, and ethics is a department of human history in which final truths are but slight an…
He holds that one pleasure can be contrary to another, explaining contrariety through the soul’s repose-like emotional states with different termini, and clarifying how sadness relates to pleasure.
*On the contrary,* The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5, 6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease." *I answer that,* We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in *Phys.* ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific nature. …
The eighth article asks whether any action is indifferent in its species, concluding that while many acts are good or evil by their objects, some neutral actions are indifferent.
the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 2] Whether the Effect of Sorrow or Pain Is to Burden the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11):…
Thomas distinguishes four species of quality, arguing that only the first species (habit and disposition) bears notions of good and evil, since it concerns a thing’s nature and end.
the subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19). Now the mode o[r] determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in rega…
He answers those who resent being pitied: pity concerns externals like poverty and offices, which are not evils; true correction is first convincing oneself that only will and reason matter.
Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son. AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED.—I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to stop this pity? It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require pity. And whether…
In teaching philosophy, Epictetus says the start of philosophy is admitting one’s feebleness about necessary matters, learning natural conceptions, questioning mere seeming, and establishing rules by which to judge good and evil.
ON THE NATURAL CONCEPTIONS. 1. The natural conceptions are common to all men, and one cannot contradict another. For which of us but affirms that the Good is profitable, and that we should choose it, and in all circumstances follow and pursue it? Which of us but affirms that uprightness is honorable and becoming? Where, then, doth the contradiction arise? Concerning the application of the natural conceptions to thin…
Epictetus teaches that virtues are good, vices evil, and indifferent things include wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, and affliction, then urges practical remembrance when facing storms or threats from Caesar.
"Me to Ciconia brought the wind from Troy." --*Od.* ix, 39. _Of things some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good things are the virtues, and those that have the nature of virtue, and the evil things the vices, and those that have the nature of vice; and the indifferent things are between these, as wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, affliction._ And how do you know this? Because Hellanicus affi…