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Freedom of will

8 passages · search this phrase →

Often appears with: will, choice, and freedom · justice as a virtue · courage and cowardice · will vs understanding · will vs externals · warning against sloth · temperance and self-mastery · source of errors · slavery as mental bondage · slavery and bondage · sin, guilt, and repentance · rusticus and epictetus

Usually: argument (5) · detachment (3) · exhortation (3) · curiosity (2) · reverence (2) · list or catalogue (1) · narrative (1) · reflection (1) · captivity (1) · confronting death (1)

Quotable
“Therefore, to avoid striking on either of these rocks, this will be the course to be pursued—that man, being taught that he has nothing good left in his possession, and being surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, should, nevertheless, be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is destitute, and to the liberty of which he is deprived; and should be roused from indolence with more earnestness, than if he were supposed to be possessed of the greatest strength.” Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 1 of 2) · precept
“You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower.” Epictetus (translated by George Long), A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with th · insight
“Diogenes was free. How was he free? Not because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him.” Epictetus (translated by George Long), A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with th · observation

Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus primary

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus · c. 167–180 CE
letter which is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian (42/43)

Marcus Aurelius lists further influences, including his governor, Diognetus, Rusticus, Apollonius of Chalcis, and Sextus, emphasizing self-control, endurance, freedom from superstition, and living “according to nature.”

[A] Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor. The character of Maximus is that of a perfect man. (See viii. 25.) 16. In my father[A] I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable resolution in the things which he had determined after due deliberation; and no vain-glory in those things which men call honors; and a love of labor and perseverance; a…

Selections from the Principles of Philosophy primary

René Descartes · 1641-1644 (Composition spanning revisions; Latin Principles issued 1644)
LETTER OF THE AUTHOR > PART I. (10/23)

He argues that our errors stem from the will being more extensive than the finite understanding, yet God cannot be blamed, and human freedom makes us praise- or blame-worthy.

XXXV. That the will is of greater extension than the understanding, and is thus the source of our errors. Further, the perception of the intellect extends only to the few things that are presented to it, and is always very limited: the will, on the other hand, may, in a certain sense, be said to be infinite, because we observe nothing that can be the object of the will of any other, even of the unlimited will of God…

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind secondary

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel · 19th century
Section I. Mind Subjective. (68/112)

Ethics should ground reason and will in an ethical psychology that sets normal standards, treats diseases of will, and links moral law to a particular notion of freedom as the substance of will realized in social and legal freedom.

social order. It is the sense that the social order, however omnipotent it may seem, is limited and finite, and that man has in him a kindred with the Eternal. It is not very satisfactory, either, as Aristotle and others have pointed out, to speak of man’s duties to himself. The phrase is analogical, like the other. But it has the merit, like that of duty to God, of reminding us that the ordinary latitude occupied b…

Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 1 of 2) primary

Jean Calvin · 1541 (initial publication of the Institutes; this record is for a later 1559/French-collated edition, but the work’s composition spans Calvin’s revisions after earlier versions)
Book I. On The Knowledge Of God The Creator. > Chapter II. Man, In His Present State, Despoiled Of Freedom Of Will, And (2/26)

Calvin transitions to freedom of will, stating that sin’s domination over humanity should drive people away from sloth and from self-boasting, humbling them to seek God’s help.

Subjected To A Miserable Slavery. Since we have seen that the domination of sin, from the time of its subjugation of the first man, not only extends over the whole race, but also exclusively possesses every soul, it now remains to be more closely investigated, whether we are despoiled of all freedom, and, if any particle of it yet remain, how far its power extends. But, that we may the more easily discover the truth…

Theodicy primary

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von · 1710-1711
book with much acrimony. But the accused won his case in a Synod. > PART THREE (63/63)

Leibniz recounts controversies over divine and creature freedom from Bayle, describing protests against Gibieuf, replies by Annat, and disputes between Jesuits and Thomists over free will.

other side not wishing to admit that they were in opposition to a learned saint whose opinions were always considered orthodox, have both performed a hundred feats of contortion, etc.' 371. The two courses which M. Bayle distinguishes here do not exclude a third course, according to which the determination of the soul does not come solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the soul, but also from …

The Golden Sayings of Epictetus, with the Hymn of Cleanthes secondary

Epictetus · c. 108–130 CE (discourses collected and later arranged)
(19/39)

He teaches how to judge friendships by whether people place their real interest in the Will rather than externals, insists that no one can rob the Will, and prays to God when sickness and death come.

“Then you will say nothing to me?” “I can only tell you this: that one who knows not who he is and to what end he was born; what kind of world this is and with whom he is associated therein; one who cannot distinguish Good and Evil, Beauty and Foulness, . . . Truth and Falsehood, will never follow Reason in shaping his desires and impulses and repulsions, nor yet in assent, denial, or suspension of judgement; but wi…

A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion primary

Epictetus (translated by George Long) · c. 100-135 CE
(3/119)

Epictetus argues that only rational judgment can reflect on itself and that people should focus on what is in their power—using examples of death, imprisonment, and trials to show one can remain free.

A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS. OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER AND NOT IN OUR POWER.—Of all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and …

A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion primary

Epictetus (translated by George Long) · c. 100-135 CE
(91/119)

Epictetus argues that freedom depends not on birth but on having a mind free of slavery’s “handles,” like Diogenes, who rejects valuing his body, friendships, and offices as truly his own.

necessary to me? Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary; do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to yo…