HKB
5 passages · search this phrase →
Often appears with: the nature and attributes of God · doubt, skepticism, and certainty · reason and the intellect · want of ideas · undiscoverable connections · the problem of evil and theodicy · the fear of death · summa theologica · sensitive knowledge · religious persecution and toleration · quieting disputes · prudence and practical wisdom
Usually: detachment (4) · argument (3) · reflection (2) · crisis of belief (1) · curiosity (1) · reverence (1)
“These postulates are not theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary; while then they do [not] extend our speculative knowledge, they give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical), and give it a right to concepts, the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason · insight
“He that knows anything, knows this, in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2 · insight
He argues reason’s ultimate speculative targets—freedom, immortality, and God—are useless for knowing experience, so their true importance lies in their practical role in guiding life.
There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative, or in its practical interests alone?…
Locke gives three causes of ignorance: lack of ideas, lack of a discoverable connection between ideas, and failure to trace and examine one’s ideas thoroughly.
Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish. 21. Fourthly, Of the three real Existences of which we have certain knowledge. FOURTHLY, As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, viz. of the REAL ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF THINGS, we have an intuitive knowledge of OUR OWN EXISTENCE, and a demonstrative knowledge …
Kant introduces postulates of practical reason—immortality, freedom, and God—claiming they are practically necessary conditions for fulfilling the moral law, extending reason’s ideas without giving speculative knowledge.
{BOOK*2|CHAPTER*2 ^paragraph 60} They all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law, by which reason determines the will directly, which will, because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these necessary conditions of obedience to its precept. These postulates are not theoretical dogmas but, suppositions practically necessary; while then they do [not] extend our speculative k…
Beginning his discussion of the existence of God, Thomas states the order of inquiries: divine essence, persons, and creation’s procession, then asks whether God’s existence is self-evident, demonstrable, and in fact.
three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only--the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological. Reply Obj. 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scrip…
He argues that the idea of a more perfect being implies God’s existence, that God is not deceitful or morally unstable, and that dependent imperfect beings (including bodies) rely on God moment by moment.
that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive. In the next place, from reflecting on the circumstance that I doubted, and that consequently my being was not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I was led to inquire w…