HKB
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Often appears with: justice as a virtue · equity, mercy, and pardon · public finance and debt · legal justice · forms of government · crime and punishment · unjust laws · the fear of death · the city and urban life · stewardship and authority · sociable life · service
Usually: argument (8) · detachment (8) · exhortation (3) · commentary or gloss (2) · reflection (2) · grief and loss (1) · curiosity (1) · reverence (1)
“Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) · insight
“Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious--for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) · observation
“In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) · precept
“Wherefore laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature, and according to the customs of the country.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · observation
“Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · insight
“a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · insight
“Consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · precept
“If however he grant this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · insight
He tells himself that if he has benefited the general interest, he has already received his reward, and should never stop doing such good.
disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking. 16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all together, and if it remembers that not one…
He frames age and life as continuous change like repeated deaths, recommends quick recourse to justice and remembrance of kinship, and says actions should aim at the common good.
hold on thee? Doth it then also void excrements? Doth it like either oxen, or sheep, graze or feed; that it also should be mortal, as well as the body? XL. Either the Gods can do nothing for us at all, or they can still and allay all the distractions and distempers of thy mind. If they can do nothing, why doest thou pray? If they can, why wouldst not thou rather pray, that they will grant unto thee, that thou mayst …
Aquinas continues the hierarchy of virtues by correcting objections about neglecting human affairs, clarifying that legal justice directly orders the common good and also commands other virtues toward community and household needs.
mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. Reply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted them…
Isidore’s definition of positive law is defended: law should be virtuous, just, possible to nature, suited to customs and times, expressed clearly, aimed at no private benefit, and directed to the common good.
is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law. But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the pr…
Aquinas explains that human law should be framed for the community rather than individuals, because its end is the common good and it must take account of many persons, matters, and times.
as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law. Obj. 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they…
Aquinas argues that human law must fit the moral capacity of most people, so it forbids only the more grievous vices that harm others, leaving lesser faults tolerated for societal stability.
Whether It Belongs to the Human Law to Repress All Vices? Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils. Obj. 2: Further, the in…
Aquinas continues by holding that human laws bind in conscience when they are just—aiming at the common good, proportioning burdens, and not exceeding the lawgiver’s power—while unjust laws bind only to avoid scandal.
Whether Human Law Binds a Man in Conscience? Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. Obj. 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends …
Aquinas explains dispensation in law: a community leader may suspend a general precept for a justified common-good reason, but doing so arbitrarily makes him unfaithful or imprudent, and only God can dispense from divine law.
*On the contrary,* The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): "A dispensation is committed to me." *I answer that,* Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense,…
Aquinas holds that prudence extends beyond private self-care to the common good, arguing against views that limit prudence to the individual, and distinguishing political prudence from justice.
*On the contrary,* Our Lord said (Matt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?" *I answer that,* According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. Bu…
The text argues that justice can be a general virtue because it directs one’s relations to others and to the common good, explaining how “legal justice” harmonizes all virtues with law’s aim.
*On the contrary,* The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue." *I answer that,* Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Acco…
He rules that private individuals may not execute sinners, because killing for the common good requires public authority, likened to a physician cutting off a limb only when entrusted with the whole body’s health.
imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others. Reply Obj. 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being…
In the question on epikeia (equity), Thomas defines it as a virtue that sets aside the letter of law in exceptional cases to preserve justice and the common good when strict legal application would fail.
*On the contrary,* The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue. *I answer that,* As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what co…