HKB
war advances to Belgium.[91] It follows that the United States is entitled, on the strict letter, to a considerable part of the cash receipts from Germany in the near future.
There is, however, a possible offset to these claims which has been mentioned already (p. 78) but must not be overlooked here. Under the Treaty, private German property in an Allied country is, in the case of countries adopting the Clearing House Scheme, applied in the first instance to debts owing from German nationals to the nationals of the Allied country in question, and the balance, if any, is retained for Reparation. What is to happen in the case of similar German assets in the United States is still undetermined. The surplus assets, the value of which may be about $300,000,000,[92] will be retained, until Congress determines otherwise, by the Enemy Property Custodian. There have been negotiations from time to time for a loan in favor of Germany on the security of these assets, but the legal position has rendered progress impossible. At any rate this important German asset is still under American control.
FOOTNOTES:
[60] A fairly adequate account of this controversy during the Peace Conference can be pieced together from the following passages: Baruch, Making of Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty, pp. 45–55; Lamont, What really happened at Paris, pp. 262–265; Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty, pp. 294–309.
[61] For these figures see Tardieu, op. cit., p. 305.
[62] It is of these passages that M. Clemenceau wrote as follows in his preface to M. Tardieu’s book: “Fort en thème d’économiste, M. Keynes (qui ne fut pas seul, dans la Conférence, à professer cette opinion) combat, sans aucun ménagement, ‘l’abus des exigences des Alliés’ (lisez: ‘de la France’) et de ses négociateurs.... Ces reproches et tant d’autres d’une violence brutale, dont je n’aurais rien dit, si l’auteur, à tous risques, n’eût cru servir sa cause en les livrant à la publicité, font assez clairement voir jusqu’où certains esprits s’étaient montés.” (In the English edition, M. Tardieu has caused the words fort en thème d’économiste to be translated by the words “with some knowledge of economics but neither imagination nor character”—which seems rather a free rendering.)
[63] At about the same date, the German Indemnity Commission (Reichsentschädigungskommission) estimated the cost at 7228 million gold marks, also on the basis of pre–war prices; that is to say, at about one–seventh of M. Dubois’ estimate.
[64] The details of this claim, so far as they have been published, are given in Appendix No. 3. The above figure comprises the items for Industrial Damages, Damage to Houses, Furniture and Fittings, Unbuilt–on Land, State Property, and Public Works.
[65] See M. Loucheur’s speech in the French Chamber, May 20, 1921.
[66] For this rate to be justified the exchange value of the franc in New York must rise to about 11 cents.
[67] M. Loucheur’s statement to the French Chamber implied that the rate of conversion was applicable to material damage as well as to pensions, and I have assumed this in what follows; but precise official information is lacking.
[68] The figures of damage done, given by M. Briand, are generally speaking rather lower than those given ten months earlier (in June 1920) in a report by M. Tardieu in his capacity as President of the Comité des Régions Dévastées. But the difference is not very material. For purposes of comparison, I give M. Tardieu’s figures below together with those of the amount of reconstruction completed at that earlier date:
Destroyed. Repaired.
Houses totally destroyed 319,269 2,000 Houses partially destroyed 313,675 182,000 Railway lines 5,534 kilos. 4,042 kilos. Canals 1,596 ” 784 ” Roads 39,000 ” 7,548 ” Bridges, embankments, etc. 4,785 ” 3,424 ”
Destroyed. Cleared from Leveled. Plowed. shells. Arable land (hectares) 3,200,000 2,900,000 1,700,000 1,150,000
Destroyed. Reconstructed Under and working. reconstruction. Factories and works 11,500 3,540 3,812