HKB
THE THIRD PUNIC WAR
[Sidenote: The dramatic representation of debates though convenient is not history.]
+1.+ It may occur to some to ask why I have not given a dramatic turn to my narrative, now that I have so striking a theme and a subject of such importance, by recording the actual speeches delivered; a thing which the majority of historians have done, by giving the appropriate arguments used on either side. That I do not reject this method altogether I have shown in several parts of my work, in which I have recorded popular harangues and expositions delivered by statesmen; but that I am not inclined to employ it on every occasion alike will now be made clear; for it would not be easy to find a subject more remarkable than this, nor material more ample for instituting a comparison of such a character. Nor indeed could any form of composition be more convenient to me. Still, as I do not think it becoming in statesmen to be ready with argument and exposition on every subject of debate without distinction, but rather to adapt their speeches to the nature of the particular occasion, so neither do I think it right for historians to practise their skill or show off their ability upon their readers: they ought on the contrary to devote their whole energies to discover and record what was really and truly said, and even of such words only those that are the most opportune and essential....
[Sidenote: The Romans were careful to have a fair pretext for war.]
[Sidenote: 32, 20.]
+2.+ This idea having been firmly fixed in the minds of all, they looked out for a suitable opportunity and a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of the world. For indeed the Romans were quite rightly very careful on this point. For instance, the general impression that they were justified in entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their defeats; but if the pretext for doing so is lame and poor the contrary effects are produced. Accordingly, as they differed as to the sentiments of the outer world on the subject, they were very nearly abandoning the war....
The policy of Rome in Africa of constantly supporting Massanissa against Carthage was mentioned in 32, 2. Frequent complaints came to Rome from the Numidian king, and the Carthaginians were said to be collecting an army contrary to treaty. Commissioners were sent over in 154 B.C. on the advice of Cato, who were roughly treated at Carthage; and when, in B.C. 151, Massanissa sent his son Gulussa with similar complaints to Rome, Cato urged immediate war. The Senate, however, again sent commissioners, among whom was Cato himself, to examine into the matter. They reported that the Carthaginians had an army and navy. An ultimatum was therefore sent, that the army and navy were to be broken up within the year, or that the next consuls should bring the question of war before the Senate (B.C. 150). Just at this crisis Utica, in enmity with Carthage, placed itself under the protection of Rome. Livy*, Ep. 48; *Appian, Pun. 75.
[Sidenote: B.C. 149. Utica puts itself under the protection of Rome.]
[Sidenote: Carthaginian plenipotentiaries at Rome.]