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Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England

Frederic William Maitland · 1897

passage 299 of 449 · book, 230. The book purports to convey ownership, 230. The book > Book does not owe week-work, for the writer who rendered *geneat* by (14/50)

↪ you wandered here via “proper ownership of possessions” — the connecting lines are tinted below

in brief
He stresses the distinction between possession and ownership, then asks whether “land belonging to communities” refers to true ownership or instead to something else such as governmental power restricting use.

[Possession and ownership.]

Also since we are apt to fall into the trick of talking about possession when we mean ownership or proprietary right, we need not perhaps ask pardon for the remark that land owned by a group of three joint tenants may be possessed in many different ways. The three may be jointly possessing the whole; each may be severally possessing a physically divided third; the whole may be possessed by one of them or by some fourth person; the possession may be rightful or wrongful.

But there is a graver question that must be raised. When we say that land belonged to communities before it belonged to individuals, are we really speaking of ownership or of something else?

[Ownership and governmental power.]

At the present day no two legal ideas seem more distinct from each other than that of governmental power and that of proprietary right. The 'sovereign' of Great Britain (be the sovereignty where it may) is not the owner of Great Britain, and if we still say that all land is 'held of' the king, we know that the abolition of this antique dogma, this caput mortuum, might be easily accomplished without any perceptible revolution in the practical rules of English law. A landowner in the United States does not 'hold of' the State or the people or the government of the State. The 'eminent domain' of the State is neither ownership nor any mode of ownership. Further, we conceive that the sovereign person or sovereign body can, without claiming any ownership in the soil, place many restrictions on the use that an owner may make of his land. A law may prohibit owners from building on certain lands: those lands are still their lands. Again, the supposed law may be not a negative but a positive rule; it may require that the owners of certain lands shall build upon them, or shall till them, or shall keep them as pasture[1167]: still neither state nor sovereign will be owner of those lands or have any proprietary interest in them. Our law may subject certain lands to a land-tax to be paid to the state in money, or to a tithe to be paid to the church in kind, but the state will not and the church will not be part-owner of those lands. Our state may habitually expropriate owners, may take their lands from them because they are felons or because their lands are wanted for the construction of railways. We may conceive it expropriating owners who have done no wrong and yet are to have no compensation; but until the expropriation takes place the state does not own the land. As with land, so with chattels. The owner of a cart may find that it is impressed for the purpose of military transport[1168] and yet the cart is his and not the state's.

[Ownership and the powers of subordinate governors.]

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topics: property, inheritance, and title · rights and liberties

Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England · Frederic William Maitland · 1897