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The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36

Livy · c. 27 BCE–17 CE (composition of the History of Rome; these books 27–36 within that span)

passage 27 of 456 · (27/52)

in brief
Hannibal uses ambushes against Roman movements near Tarentum and Petelia, prompting a failed reconnaissance by Marcellus and Crispinus that ends with Marcellus’s death and heavy Roman losses.

and drew up their troops for action, confidently hoping, that if the enemy would hazard an engagement with two consular armies united, they might put an end to the war.

  1. As Hannibal, who gained one and lost the other of the two battles which he fought the preceding year with Marcellus, would have equal grounds for hope and fear, should he encounter the same general again; so was he far from thinking himself a match for the two consuls together. Directing his attention, therefore, wholly to his own peculiar arts, he looked out for an opportunity for planting an ambuscade. Slight battles, however, were fought between the two camps with varying success. But the consuls, thinking it probable that the summer would be spun out in engagements of this kind, and being of opinion that the siege of Locri might be going on notwithstanding, wrote to Lucius Cincius to pass over to Locri with his fleet from Sicily. And that the walls might be besieged by land also, they ordered one half of the army, which formed the garrison of Tarentum, to be marched thither. Hannibal having found from certain Thurians that these things would be done, sent a body of troops to lie in ambush on the road leading from Tarentum. There, under the hill of Petelia, three thousand cavalry and two thousand foot were placed in concealment. The Romans, who proceeded without exploring their way, having fallen into the ambuscade, as many as two thousand soldiers were slain, and about twelve hundred made prisoners. The others, who were scattered in flight through the fields and forests, returned to Tarentum. There was a rising ground covered with wood situated between the Punic and Roman camps, which was occupied at first by neither party, because the Romans were unacquainted with its nature on that side which faced the enemy's camp, while Hannibal had supposed it better adapted for an ambuscade than a camp. Accordingly, he had sent thither, by night, several troops of Numidians, concealing them in the midst of the wood. Not one of them stirred from his position by day, lest their arms or themselves should be observed from a distance. There was a general murmur in the Roman camp, that this eminence ought to be occupied and secured by a fort, lest if it should be seized by Hannibal they should have the enemy, as it were, immediately over their heads. Marcellus was moved by this consideration, and observed to his colleague, "Why not go ourselves with a few horsemen and reconnoitre? The matter being examined with our own eyes, will make our measures more certain." Crispinus consenting, they set out with two hundred and twenty horsemen, of which forty were Fregellans, the rest Tuscans. Marcus Marcellus, the consul's son, and Aulus Manlius, military tribunes, together with two prefects of the allies, Lucius Arennius and Manius Aulius, accompanied them. Some historians have recorded, that Marcellus had offered sacrifices on that day, and that in the first victim slain, the liver was found without its head; in the second, that all the usual parts were present, and that there was also an excrescence in the head. That the aruspex was not, indeed, pleased that the entrails should first have appeared mutilated and foul, and then too exuberant.
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topics: battle and tactics · conquest, plunder, and captives · military discipline and training

The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 · Livy · 27 BCE–17