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Conspiracy of Catiline and the Jurgurthine War

Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus) · c. 44-40 BCE primary

passage 121 of 160 · (121/151)

in brief
Marius uses two nearby hills to secure retreat space, positions Sulla with cavalry by a spring hill, then attacks from another hill as barbarians encamp around fires; later he orders silence and a night ambush that routs Moors and Getulians.

the nature of the ground or chance allowed them to unite, in circular bodies, and thus secured on every side, and regularly drawn up, withstood the attacks of the enemy.

XCVIII. Marius, in this desperate emergency, was not more alarmed or disheartened than on any previous occasion, but rode about with his troop of cavalry, which he had formed of his bravest soldiers rather than his nearest friends, in every quarter of the field, sometimes supporting his own men when giving way, sometimes charging the enemy where they were thickest, and doing service to his troops with his sword, since, in the general confusion, he was unable to command with his voice.

The day had now closed, yet the barbarians abated nothing of their impetuosity, but, expecting that the night would be in their favor, pressed forward, as their kings had directed them, with increased violence. Marius, in consequence, resolved upon a measure suited to his circumstances, and, that his men might have a place of retreat, took possession of two hills contiguous to each other, on one of which, too small for a camp, there was an abundant spring of water, while the other, being mostly elevated and steep, and requiring little fortification, was suited for his purpose as a place of encampment. He then ordered Sylla, with a body of cavalry, to take his station for the night on the eminence containing the spring, while he himself collected his scattered troops by degrees, the enemy being not less disordered[290], and led them all at a quick march[291] up the other hill. Thus the kings, obliged by the strength of the Roman position, were deterred from continuing the combat; yet they did not allow their men to withdraw to a distance, but, surrounding both hills with a large force, encamped without any regular order. Having then lighted numerous fires, the barbarians, after their custom, spent most of the night in merriment, exultation, and tumultuous clamor, the kings, elated at having kept their ground, conducting themselves as conquerors. This scene, plainly visible to the Romans, under cover of the night and on the higher ground, afforded great encouragement to them.

XCIX. Marius, accordingly, deriving much confidence from the imprudence of the enemy, ordered the strictest possible silence to be kept, not allowing even the trumpets, as was usual, to be sounded when the watches were changed;[292] cavalry, and legions, to sound all and then, when day approached, and the enemy were fatigued and just sinking to sleep, he ordered the sentinels, with the trumpeters of the auxiliary cohorts,[293] their instruments at once, and the soldiers, at the same time, to raise a shout, and sally forth from the camp[294] upon the enemy. The Moors and Getulians, suddenly roused by the strange and terrible noise, could neither flee, nor take up arms, could neither act, nor provide for their security, so completely had fear, like a stupor,[295] from the uproar and shouting, the absence of support, the charge of our troops, and the tumult and alarm, seized upon them all. The whole of them were consequently routed and put to flight; most of their arms, and military standards, were taken; and more were killed in this than in all former battles, their escape being impeded by sleep and the sudden alarm.

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topics: battle and tactics · naval warfare and sea power

Conspiracy of Catiline and the Jurgurthine War · Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus) · 44–40 BCE