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Conspiracy of Catiline and the Jurgurthine War

Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus) · c. 44-40 BCE primary

passage 93 of 160 · (93/151)

in brief
As Metellus descends the mountain, he fears thirst and secures the river; Jugurtha attacks from concealment, using cavalry feints, surrounding tactics, and dispersion to disrupt the Romans.

He assigned Marius his post behind the front line[168], and took on himself the command of the cavalry on the left wing, which, on the march, had become the van[169].

When Jugurtha perceived that the rear of the Roman army had passed his first line, he took possession of that part of the mountain from which Metellus had descended, with a body of about two thousand infantry, that it might not serve the enemy, if they were driven back, as a place of retreat, and afterward as a post of defense; and then, ordering the signal to be given, suddenly commenced his attack. Some of his Numidians made havoc in the rear of the Romans, while others assailed them on the right and left wings; they all advanced and charged furiously, and every where threw the consul's troops into confusion. Even those of our men who made the stoutest resistance, were baffled by the enemy's versatile method of fighting, and wounded from a distance, without having the power of wounding in return, or of coming to close combat; for the Numidian cavalry, as they had been previously instructed by Jugurtha, retreated whenever a troop of Romans attempted to pursue them, but did not keep in a body, or collect themselves into one place, but dispersed as widely as possible. Thus, being superior in numbers, if they could not deter the Romans from pursuing, they surrounded them, when disordered, on the rear or flank, or, if the hill seemed more convenient for retreat than the plain, the Numidian horses, being accustomed to the brushwood, easily made their way among it, while the difficulty of the ascent, and want of acquaintance with the ground, impeded those of the Romans.

LI. The aspect of the whole struggle[170] was indeed various, perplexing, direful, and lamentable; the men, separated from their comrades, were partly fleeing, partly pursuing; neither standards nor ranks were regarded, but wherever danger pressed, there they made a stand and defended themselves; arms and weapons, horses and men, enemies, and fellow-countrymen, were all mingled in confusion; nothing was done by direction or command, but chance ordered every thing. Though the day, therefore, was now far advanced, the event of the contest was still uncertain. At last, however, when all were faint with exertion and the heat of the day, Metellus, observing that the Numidians were less vigorous in their charges, drew his troops together by degrees, restored order among them, and led four cohorts of the legions against the enemy's infantry, of whom a great number, overcome with fatigue, had seated themselves on the high ground. He at the same time entreated and exhorted his men not to lose courage, nor to suffer a flying enemy to be victorious; adding that they had neither camp nor citadel to which they could flee, but that their only dependence was on their arms. Nor was Jugurtha, in the mean time, inactive; he rode round among his troops, cheered them, renewed the contest, and, at the head of a select body, made every possible effort for victory; supporting his own men, charging such of the enemy as wavered, and repressing with missiles such as he saw remaining unshaken.

LII. Thus did these two commanders, both eminent men, maintain the contest against each other. In personal ability they were equal, but in circumstances unequal. Metellus had resolute troops, but a disadvantageous position; Jugurtha had every thing in his favor except men. At last the Romans, seeing that they had no place of refuge, that the enemy allowed no opportunity for a regular engagement, and that the evening was fast approaching, forced their way, according to the orders which were given, up the hill. The Numidians were thus driven from their position, routed, and put to flight; a few of them were slain, but their speed, and the enemy's ignorance of the country[171], saved the greater number of them.

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topics: battle and tactics · military discipline and training · supply, logistics, and encampment

Conspiracy of Catiline and the Jurgurthine War · Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus) · 44–40 BCE