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The Critique of Pure Reason

Immanuel Kant · 1781–1787 primary

passage 363 of 403 · SECTION I. OF SPACE > Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics (12/14)

in brief
Kant says skepticism’s polemic targets dogmatists who build systems without examining objective first principles, but skepticism itself cannot settle how far reason can reach.

the limitation of human faculties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.

The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this cannot help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours; the investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason.

Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors into which he strayed, although setting out on the path of truth and certitude.

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topics: doubt, skepticism, and certainty · logic, method, and demonstration · reason and the intellect

The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant · 1781–1787