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The Federalist Papers

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08 primary

passage 182 of 360 · (176/342)

in brief
He argues that, even with federal taxation powers, federal operations will be limited and often rely on state-appointed officers, so state influence should remain decisive over revenue and administration.

those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. I

t is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.

Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale.

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topics: counsel and advisers to rulers · taxation, tribute, and revenue

The Federalist Papers · Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787–1788