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War powers

3 passages · search this phrase →

Often appears with: strategy and the aims of war · war vs peace executive prerogative · veto authority · self-preservation principle · presidential foreign policy authority · president vs king · political legitimacy and consent · national defense · military readiness in peacetime · legislative vs executive roles · hereditary monarchy · forms of government

Usually: argument (3) · temptation (1) · censure (1) · detachment (1) · exhortation (1)

Quotable
“What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.” Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison, The Federalist Papers · insight

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(156/342)

Madison argues that security against foreign danger requires confiding key powers—declaring war, raising armies, and equipping fleets—to the federal councils, and he rejects limiting force because offense sets the terms of defense.

bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety. How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of…

The Federalist Papers primary

Alexander Hamilton; John Jay; James Madison · 1787-10-1788-08
(259/342)

Hamilton concludes by listing key differences between the elected President and the hereditary British king—term length, accountability, veto strength, military and war powers, treaty and appointment authority—then rejects claims that they are alike.

of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group. The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other i…

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2 primary

United States. Constitutional Convention · 1787-07-19 to 1787-09-17 (convention debates recorded; excerpts reflect entries in the official journal as presented here)
Act to which the States by their Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself. > act of the ordinary legislatures to be equally authentic, (26/65)

The delegates argued about whether the President or the government should “declare” war versus “make” it, then rejected adding “and peace,” and ended the session with adjournment.

M^r Madison and M^r Gerry moved to insert "*declare*," striking out "*make*" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks. M^r Sherman thought it stood very well. The Executive sh^d be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" is better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much. M^r Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.…