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Often appears with: temperance and self-mastery · justice as a virtue · will, choice, and freedom · virtue as enough · using accidents well · turn to self · the passions and the emotions · the fear of death · study vs rest · sleep and death · scipio anger · ruling faculty
Usually: argument (4) · exhortation (3) · the test or trial (2) · censure (2) · reflection (1) · speech or oration (1) · ambition and its cost (1) · detachment (1) · indignation (1) · praise (1)
“For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only... but that they may enjoy what they desire, and not wish for it in vain;” Aristotle, Politics: A Treatise on Government · observation
“There is not so much danger to be apprehended by persons at our time of life from armed foes, as from the pleasures which surround us on all sides.” Livy, The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 · precept
“Subdue your passions. Beware how you deform many good qualities by one vice, and mar the credit of so many meritorious deeds.” Livy, The History of Rome, Books 27 to 36 · precept
“If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it.” Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius · insight
“Life is to most, such as could not be endured without frequent intermission of existence: Homer, therefore, has thought it an office worthy of the goddess of wisdom, to lay Ulysses asleep when landed on Phaeacia.” Samuel Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, in Sixteen Volumes. Vol · observation
Scipio becomes anxious when he learns Masinissa married Sophonisba in haste without consulting Laelius; Laelius admonishes Masinissa to master passions and reminds him that Syphax and his entire kingdom will be treated as Roman booty, likely including Sophonisba’s fate.
more firm than Syphax; but even more incautious by reason of his youth. Doubtless he had shown greater folly and want of self-control in marrying her than he himself had." 14. These words, dictated not merely by the hatred naturally felt towards an enemy, but also by the anguish of jealousy, on seeing the object of his affections in the possession of his rival, affected the mind of Scipio with no ordinary degree of …
He argues that only judgments and ruling-faculty disturbances harm us, distinguishes perception from rational harm, urges temperate acceptance of events, and uses examples to show how to steady the mind.
not reason.—Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own opinion about itself (VII. 16). 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an evil to the constitution of plants. So then that w…
Johnson continues his essay on sleep, contrasting healthy rest with perpetual wakefulness, discussing the study-hours question, and arguing that sleep is tied to virtue, temperance, and the image of death.
paid, unless we could cease to be men; for Alexander declared, that nothing convinced him that he was not a divinity, but his not being able to live without sleep. To live without sleep in our present fluctuating state, however desirably it might seem to the lady in Clelia, can surely be the wish only of the young or the ignorant; to every one else, a perpetual vigil will appear to be a state of wretchedness, second…
He develops heroism’s social and ethical features—generosity without petty calculation and a mockery of false prudence—then illustrates magnanimous hospitality, temperance, and the greatness of virtue “enough” without comfort.
a sensual prosperity; for every heroic act measures itself by its contempt of some external good. But it finds its own success at last, and then the prudent also extol. Self-trust is the essence of heroism. It is the state of the soul at war, and its ultimate objects are the last defiance of falsehood and wrong, and the power to bear all that can be inflicted by evil agents. It speaks the truth and it is just, gener…
He argues that crime comes from desires beyond necessities, and proposes remedies like moderate subsistence, temperance, and seeking pleasure in philosophy; he then criticizes Phaleas for limiting rules and for neglecting war readiness.
"When good and bad do equal honours share." For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would then have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy what they desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desire extend beyond the common necessaries of life, they were be wicked to gratify them; and not only …
When any accident happens, turn inward and ask what power you have to use it well—temperance for beauty, endurance for pain, patience for insults—so appearances don’t overwhelm you.
But if ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention be carefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (the uninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, he also who keeps company with him must become impure, though he should happen to be pure. Take (apply) the things which relate to the body as far as the bare use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves; but…