HKB
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Often appears with: the problem of evil and theodicy · will, choice, and freedom · the nature and attributes of God · providence and divine governance · reason and the intellect · free will · fate, destiny, and necessity · zeus and providence · two principles in god · theology of divine goodness · theodicy against bayle · theodicy
Usually: crisis of belief (9) · argument (6) · detachment (6) · skepticism (3) · reflection (2) · dialogue (1) · law or decree (1) · sudden reversal of fortune (1) · curiosity (1) · exhortation (1)
“There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray: one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary... the other consists in the discussion of continuity and of the indivisibles” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von, Theodicy · insight
“The difficulties are distinguishable into two classes. The one kind springs from man's freedom... The other kind concerns the conduct of God...” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von, Theodicy · observation
“Evil needs no such explanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither _primum frigidum_ nor principle of darkness.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von, Theodicy · insight
“We have had more solid talk here than at any place where we have been.” James Boswell, The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Jo · observation
“As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.” Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius · insight
“To go from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in man’s power to enable him not to fall into real evils.” Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius · precept
It argues that the origin of evil can’t be altered because Zeus or providence rules the universe, and it cites Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius to claim evil is not part of reality’s constitution.
speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected from all that Antoninus has said. The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and that he gives to men out of each according to his pleasure; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the wi…
Augustine says he still could not see the cause of evil without making God mutable, tries to locate evil in free will and punishment, and argues about angels and the devil without yet escaping confusion.
those who deserved wholly to be vomited out of the overcharged stomach; for they had no escape, without horrible blasphemy of heart and tongue, thus thinking and speaking of Thee. But I also as yet, although I held and was firmly persuaded that Thou our Lord the true God, who madest not only our souls, but our bodies, and not only our souls and bodies, but all beings, and all things, wert undefilable and unalterable…
Socrates adds that young guardians should not hear stories of divine quarrels (giant battles, Hephaestus binding, Zeus’ fights), and he lays out a theological rule: God is always truly good, so evils must come from other causes.
I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated. Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or l…
Friday, 27 August, Boswell records Johnson’s conversation on evil, free will versus “machine” humans, poetry about toil, and sacrament tokens at Caldermanse, plus a skeptical appraisal of M’Aulay’s St Kilda history.
Warton, Lord Lucan, Mr Burke junior, Lord Palmerston, Dr Burney, Sir William Hamilton, and Dr Warren, it will be acknowledged that we might establish a second university of high reputation.] We got at night to Banff. I sent Joseph on to Duff house: but Earl Fife was not at home, which I regretted much, as we should have had a very elegant reception from his lordship. We found here but an indifferent inn. [Footnote: …
At Rosedow, Boswell describes Johnson’s reflections on dress and his sermonlike discourse on the origin of evil and free agency, then the party travels to Cameron (Commissary Smollet’s seat) by coach and debates “a state of nature.”
He was much pleased with the scene, which is so well known by the accounts of various travellers, that it is unnecessary for me to attempt any description of it. I recollect none of his conversation, except that, when talking of dress, he said, 'Sir, were I to have any thing fine, it should be very fine. Were I to wear a ring, it should not be a bauble, but a stone of great value. Were I to wear a laced or embroider…
He frames the treatise as addressing two “labyrinths” of reason—free vs necessary (especially evil’s origin) and issues of continuity/infinite—then pivots to practical concerns about necessity.
the public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which I offer here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray: one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in the production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion of continuity and of the indivisibles which ap…
He describes how he prepared his position on evil and necessity through reading and discussions with theologians and philosophers, including Hobbes, Spinoza, and others, aiming to reconcile reason and faith.
am, then, of the general opinion in this respect; but I hope that my explanation will have added clearness and lucidity, and even a more ample range, to that opinion. Now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties of M. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas which I had had for some time already, on the difficulties put forward by him[67] in opposition to those wh…
Leibniz describes his new treatise on evil: he divides difficulties between human freedom (seeming incompatible with divine nature yet necessary for guilt) and God’s cooperation in evil’s physical and moral aspects.
1. Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation to evil. The *difficulties* are distinguishable into two classes. The one kind springs from man's freedom, which appears incompa…
Leibniz develops his theodicy: evil and apparent disorder fit within divine plans because two principles are in God (understanding and will) and power is a third, and he offers a critique of Bayle’s objections.
worked wonders, and will laugh at what he will call the chimeras of the moderns, who claim to explain through mechanical structure what passes in the body of an animal. 153. The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, _per principium maleficum_, is of the same nature. Evil needs no such explanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither _primum frigidum_ nor principle of darkness. …
He argues that evil is explained by the misuse of free will, tracing the first wickedness to the Devil and fallen angels, and interpreting conflicting scriptural accounts by cross-referencing authorship.
is problematical, God having revealed to us all that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes, and not what is needed for our understanding thereof. 273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse of free will, and to evil will, in order to account for other evils, [295] since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified, the ordinary system of the t…