HKB
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Often appears with: reason and the intellect · prudence and practical wisdom · will, choice, and freedom · understanding science wisdom · theological virtues · the passions and the emotions · speculative truth · sorrow and activity · prudence and annexed virtues · practical reason · moral virtues · knowledge and causes
Usually: detachment (3) · argument (1) · commentary or gloss (1) · reflection (1) · confronting death (1) · curiosity (1)
“There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.” Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) · observation
Aquinas introduces the next question by dividing virtues into intellectual, moral, and theological, and states that the first six inquiries concern speculative intellect’s habits and prudence-related virtues.
Whether the Will Can Be the Subject of Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every vi…
Aquinas argues intellectual virtues also observe a mean: speculative virtues are measured by things themselves, while practical virtues are measured in conformity with right appetite, with excess in false affirmation and deficiency in false denial.
the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, as stated in *Metaph.* x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so …
The third article treats whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity, distinguishing kinds of knowing and the intellectual virtues: understanding, science, and wisdom.
away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. Obj. 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken a…