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Novanglus, and Massachusettensis

John Adams primary

passage 238 of 279 · (238/240)

↪ you wandered here via “inalienable rights covenant” — the connecting lines are tinted below

in brief
Adams weighs whether human conflicts, including those involving servants and abolition of slavery, can be resolved gradually or only by force, and he outlines a natural-rights view where rights come from nature and bind no one without consent.

servants clash, and can be decided only by force? I adore the idea of gradual abolitions! But who shall decide how fast or how slowly these abolitions shall be made?

  1. From individual independence he proceeded to association. If it was inconsistent with the dignity of human nature to say, that men were gregarious animals, like wild horses and wild geese, it surely could offend no delicacy to say they were social animals by nature; that they were mutual sympathies; and, above all, the sweet attraction of the sexes, which must soon draw them together in little groups, and by degrees in larger congregations, for mutual assistance and defence. And this must have happened before any formal covenant, by express words or signs, was concluded. When general counsels and deliberations commenced, the objects could be no other than the mutual defence and security of every individual for his life, his liberty, and his property. To suppose them to have surrendered these in any other way than by equal rules and general consent, was to suppose them ideots or madmen, whose acts were never binding. To suppose them surprised by fraud, or compelled by force, into any other compact, such fraud and such force could confer no obligation. Every man had a right to trample it under foot whenever he pleased. In short, he asserted these rights to be derived only from nature, and the author of nature; that they were inherent, inalienable, and indefeasible by any laws, pacts, contracts, covenants, or stipulations, which man could devise.

  2. These principles and these rights were wrought into the English constitution as fundamental laws. And under this head he went back to the old Saxon laws, and to Magna Charta, and the fifty confirmations of it in parliament, and the execrations ordained against the violators of it, and the national vengeance which had been taken on them from time to time, down to the Jameses and Charleses; and to the petition of rights and the bill of rights, and the revolution. He asserted, that the security of these rights to life, liberty, and property, had been the object of all those struggles against arbitrary power, temporal and spiritual, civil and political, military and ecclesiastical, in every age. He asserted, that our ancestors, as British subjects, and we, their descendants, as British subjects, were entitled to all those rights, by the British constitution, as well as by the law of nature, and our provincial charter, as much as any inhabitant of London or Bristol, or any part of England; and were not to be cheated out of them by any phantom of "virtual representation," or any other fiction of law or politics, or any monkish trick of deceit and hypocrisy.

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topics: justice as a virtue · rights and liberties · slavery and bondage

Novanglus, and Massachusettensis · John Adams · 1774–1775