HKB

← back

Novanglus, and Massachusettensis

John Adams primary

passage 59 of 279 · (59/240)

in brief
Adams continues with Locke’s view that people should judge when governors act contrary to trust, warns against passive obedience, and uses this to dismiss pro-government New York and Boston writers.

returned to again, as soon as the winds, weather, and other circumstances would let him." This chiefly takes place with respect to kings, whose power is limited by fundamental laws.

If it is objected, that the people being ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government, in the unsteady opinion and the uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; the same author will answer you, that on the contrary, people are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest. England, for instance, notwithstanding the many revolutions that have been seen in that kingdom, has always kept to its old legislative of king, lords, and commons; and whatever provocations have made the crown to be taken from some of their princes' heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. No more, says Mr. Locke, than any other hypothesis. For when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power; cry up their governors as you will for sons of Jupiter, let them be sacred and divine, descended or authorised from heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. 2. Such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people, without mutiny and murmur. 3. This power in the people of providing for their safety anew by a legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it; for rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government; those whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify the violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when men by entering into society, and civil government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace and unity, among themselves; those who set up force again, in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, do bring back again the state of war, and are properly, rebels, as the author shews. In the last place, he demonstrates that there are also greater inconveniencies in allowing all to those that govern, than in granting something to the people. But it will be said, that ill affected and factious men may spread among the people, and make them believe that the prince or legislative, act contrary to their trust, when they only make use of their due prerogative. To this Mr. Locke answers, that the people however is to judge of all that; because no body can better judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, than he who deputed him. He might make the like query, (says Mr. LeClerk, from whom this extract is taken) and ask, whether the people being oppressed by an authority which they set up, but for their own good, it is just, that those who are vested with this authority, and of which they are complaining, should themselves be judges of the complaints made against them. The greatest flatterers of kings, dare not say, that the people are obliged to suffer absolutely all their humours, how irregular soever they be; and therefore must confess, that when no regard is had to their complaints, the very foundations of society are destroyed; the prince and people are in a state of war with each other, like two independent states, that are doing themselves justice, and acknowledge no person upon earth, who in a sovereign manner, can determine the disputes between them, &c.

← previous passage read in the full work → next passage →

topics: justice as a virtue · natural law and higher law · political legitimacy and consent

Novanglus, and Massachusettensis · John Adams · 1774–1775