as of some consequence also to get rid of the scruples which some members of the State Legislatures might derive from their oaths to support & maintain the existing Constitutions.
M^r Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions within the Union, which had given a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in the case of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two modes in point of expediency he thought all the considerations which recommended this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the Legislatures for examining and adopting it.
On question on M^r Elseworth's motion to refer the plan to the Legislatures of the States
N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Gov^r Morris moved that the reference of the plan be made to one general Convention, chosen & authorized by the people to consider, amend, & establish the same.--Not seconded.
On question for agreeing to Resolution 19. touching the mode of Ratification as reported from the Committee of the Whole; viz, to refer the Const^n, after the approbation of Cong^s to assemblies chosen by the people;
N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Gov^r Morris & M^r King moved that the representation in the second branch consist of ---- members from each State, who shall vote per capita.
M^r Elseworth said he had always approved of voting in that mode.
M^r Gov^r Morris moved to fill the blank with three. He wished the Senate to be a pretty numerous body. If two members only should be allowed to each State, and a majority be made a quorum, the power would be lodged in 14 members, which was too small a number for such a trust.
M^r Ghorum preferred two to three members for the blank. A small number was most convenient for deciding on peace & war &c. which he expected would be vested in the 2^d branch. The number of States will also increase. Kentucky, Vermont, the Province of Mayne & Franklin will probably soon be added to the present number. He presumed also that some of the largest States would be divided. The strength of the General Gov^t will lie not in the largeness, but in the smallness of the States.