from which it was apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of every precaution the General Gov^t would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Gov^{ts}.
M^r Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of encroachment from the Gen^l Gov^t than from the State Gov^{ts} 2. that the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency.--But it will be said that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the Gen^l Gov^t will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the Gov^{ts} of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the Gen^l Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations dependent on the Gen^l Legislature; Why sh^d it follow that the Gen^l Gov^t w^d take from the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General Gov^t to State Gov^{ts} is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary ag^{st} encroachments of the State Gov^{ts} on the Gen^l Gov^t than of the latter on the former. The great objection made ag^{st} an abolition of the State Gov^{ts} was that the Gen^l Gov^t could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not ag^{st} the probable abuse of the general power, but ag^{st} the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the Gen^l Gov^t itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the Gen^l Gov^t to extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the State Gov^{ts} the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Gen^l Government to absorb the State Gov^{ts} no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Gov^{ts} towards an independence on the General Gov^t and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of two Branches"
Mass. ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The third resolution of the Report taken into consideration.