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Essays on the Constitution of the United States

Paul Leicester Ford · 1787-1788 (essays/pamphlet arguments originally published in newspapers during the U.S. Constitution’s ratification debates; this book is a later compilation)

passage 87 of 228 · Letter Of Caution, Written By Samuel Chase. > Section 4, of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every state in the Union a Republican Form of Government; and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.—At the perusal of this clause, anti-federalism must blush, and opposition hide its head. Could anything have more openly, or more plainly evinced to the world, the noble motives which influenced the conduct of the delegates of America, than the clause aforementioned? it provides, that a republican form of government shall be guaranteed to each state in the Union. The inhabitants of America are surely acquainted with the principles of republicanism, and will certainly demand the establishment of them, in their fullest extent. (65/91)

doubts. Certainly this must have been from inattention, and not thro’ any want of ability; as all his honorable friends allow him to be a politician even of metaphysical nicety.

In a question of such magnitude, every candid man will consent to discuss objections, which are stated with perspicuity; but to follow the honorable writer into the field of conjecture, and combat phantoms, uncertain whether or not they are the same which terrified him, is a task too laborious for patience itself. Such must be the writer’s situation in replying to the next objection, “that some of the powers of the legislature are ambiguous, and others indefinite and dangerous.” There are many powers given to the legislature; if any of them are dangerous, the people have a right to know which they are, and how they will operate, that we may guard against the evil. The charge of being ambiguous and indefinite may be brought against every human composition, and necessarily arises from the imperfection of language. Perhaps no two men will express the same sentiment in the same manner, and by the same words; neither do they connect precisely the same ideas with the same words. From hence arises an ambiguity in all language, with which the most perspicuous and precise writers are in a degree chargeable. Some persons never attain to the happy art of perspicuous expression, and it is equally true that some persons thro’ a mental defect of their own, will judge the most correct and certain language of others to be indefinite and ambiguous. As Mr. Gerry is the first and only man who has charged the new Constitution with ambiguousness, is there not room to suspect that his understanding is different from other men’s, and whether it be better or worse, the Landholder presumes not to decide.

It is an excellency of this Constitution that it is expressed with brevity, and in the plain, common language of mankind.

Had it swelled into the magnitude of a volume, there would have been more room to entrap the unwary, and the people who are to be its judges would have had neither patience nor opportunity to understand it. Had it been expressed in the scientific language of law, or those terms of art which we often find in political compositions, to the honorable gentleman it might have appeared more definite and less ambiguous; but to the great body of the people altogether obscure, and to accept it they must leap into the dark.

The people to whom in this case the great appeal is made, best understand those compositions which are concise and in their own language. Had the powers given to the legislature been loaded with provisos, and such qualifications as a lawyer who is so cunning as even to suspect himself, would probably have intermingled; there would have been much more of a deception in the case. It would not be difficult to shew that every power given to the legislature is necessary for national defence and justice, and to protect the rights of the people who create this authority for their own advantage; but to consider each one particularly would exceed the limits of my design.

I shall, therefore, select two powers given them, which have been more abused to oppress and enslave mankind, than all the others with which this or any legislature on earth is cloathed—the right of taxation or of collecting money from the people; and of raising and supporting armies.

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Essays on the Constitution of the United States · Paul Leicester Ford · 1787–1788