HKB
as they still are, without an answer, or that, if, contrary to all expectation, they should be rejected, in that case the Republic ought not to expect a better treatment.
That, for these reasons and many others, the petitioners had flattered themselves that we should long ago have opened negotiations, and a closer correspondence, with the United States of America. But this important work appeared to meet with difficulties with some, as incompatible with the accession of this Republic to the armed neutrality, and, in course, with the accepted mediation; whilst that others cannot be persuaded to make this so necessary step, in the opinion that we cannot draw any advantage, or at least of much importance, from a more strict connection with America: Reasons, according to the petitioners, the frivolity of which is apparent to every one who is not filled with prejudice, without having occasion to employ many words to point it out. For, as to the first point, supposing, for a moment, that it might be made a question whether the Republic, after her accession to the armed neutrality, before the war with England, could take a step of this nature, without renouncing at the same time the advantages of the armed neutrality which it had embraced; it is at least very certain, that every difficulty concerning the competency of the Republic to take a similar step vanishes and disappears of itself at present, when it finds itself involved in a war with Great Britain, since from that moment she could not only demand the assistance and succour of all the confederates in the armed neutrality, but that thereby the finds herself authorized, for her own defence, to employ all sorts of means, violent and others, which she could not before adopt nor put in use, while she was really in the position of a neutral power which would profit of the advantages of the armed neutrality. This reasoning then proves evidently, that, in the present situation of affairs, the Republic might acknowledge the independence of America; and, notwithstanding this, claim of full right the assistance of her neutral allies, at least, if we would not maintain one of the two following absurdities: That, notwithstanding the violent aggression of England in resentment of our accession to the armed neutrality, we dare not defend ourselves, until our confederates shall think proper to come to our assistance; or, otherwise, that being attacked by the English, it should be permitted us, conformably to the rights of the armed neutrality, to resist them in arms, whether on the Doggers-bank or elsewhere, but not by contracting alliances, which certainly do no injury or harm to the convention of the armed neutrality, notwithstanding even the small hope we have of being succored by the allies of the armed confederation. The argument of the mediation is still more contrary to common sense in this, that it supposes, that the Republic, by accepting the mediation, has also renounced the employment of all the means, by the way of arms, of alliances, or otherwise, which it might judge useful or necessary to annoy her enemy: a supposition, which certainly is destitute of all foundation, and which would reduce it simply to a real suspension of hostilities on the part of the Republic only; to which the Republic can never have consented, neither directly nor indirectly.