HKB
and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.
Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.
Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
QUESTION 120
OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (In Two Articles)
We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 1]
Whether "Epikeia" [*Epieikeia] Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that epikeia is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet epikeia does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore epikeia is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them." But seemingly epikeia pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore epikeia is a vice rather than a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to epikeia to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions,* under *Law i: "It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret between equity and law." Therefore the act of epikeia is unlawful: and consequently epikeia is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue.