HKB
the three powers of government of Montesquieu's postulate. Under Roosevelt the first two of these developments were brought to a pitch not formerly approximated, except temporarily during World War I.
The truth is that the practice of delegated legislation is inevitably and inextricably involved with the whole idea of governmental intervention in the economic field, where the conditions to be regulated are of infinite complexity and are constantly undergoing change. Granted such intervention, it is simply out of the question to demand that Congress should attempt to impose upon the shifting and complex scene the relatively permanent molds of statutory provision, unqualified by a large degree of administrative discretion. One of the major reasons urged for governmental intervention is furnished by the need for gearing the different parts of the industrial process with one another for a planned result. In wartime this need is freely conceded by all; but its need in economic crisis is conceivably even greater, the results sought being more complex. So in the interest both of unity of design and of flexibility of detail, presidential power today takes increasing toll from both ends of the legislative process--both from the formulation of legislation and from its administration. In other words, as a barrier capable of preventing such fusion of presidential and congressional power, the principle of the Separation of Powers does not appear to have retained much of its original effectiveness; for on only one occasion[31] prior to the disallowance, in Youngstown v. Sawyer,[32] President Truman's seizure in April 1952 of the steel industry has the Court been constrained to condemn, as in conflict with that principle, a congressional delegation of legislative power. Indeed, its application in the field of foreign relations has been virtually terminated by Justice Sutherland's opinion in the Curtiss-Wright Case.[33]
The Youngstown Opinion appears to rest on the proposition that since Congress could have ordered the seizure, e.g., under the necessary and proper clause, the President, in making it on his own, usurped "legislative power" and thereby violated the principle of the Separation of Powers. In referring to this proposition, the Chief Justice (in his dissenting opinion, for himself and Justices Reed and Minton) quoted as follows from a 1915 brief of the then Solicitor General of the United States on this same question:
The function of making laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive can not exercise that function to any degree. But this is not to say that all of the subjects concerning which laws might be made are perforce removed from the possibility of Executive influence. The Executive may act upon things and upon men in many relations which have not, though they might have, been actually regulated by Congress.
In other words, just as there are fields which are peculiar to Congress and fields which are peculiar to the Executive, so there are fields which are common to both, in the sense that the Executive may move within them until they shall have been occupied by legislative action. These are not the fields of legislative prerogative, but fields within which the lawmaking power may enter and dominate whenever it chooses. This situation results from the fact that the President is the active agent, not of Congress, but of the Nation.[34]
Or, in more general terms, the fact that one of the three departments may apply its distinctive techniques to a certain subject matter sheds little or no light on the question whether one of the other departments may deal with the same subject matter according to its distinctive techniques. Indeed, were it otherwise, the action of the Court in disallowing President Truman's seizure order would have been of very questionable validity, inasmuch as the President himself conceded that Congress could do so.
The conception of the Separation of Powers doctrine advanced in Youngstown appears to have been an ad hoc discovery for the purpose of disposing of that particular case.