HKB
Whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, or knowledge, or goodness.
God did not choose the best course in creating this world.
Therefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness.
ANSWER
I deny the minor, that is to say, the second premiss of this syllogism, and the opponent proves it by this
PROSYLLOGISM
Whoever makes things in which there is evil, and which could have been made without any evil, or need not have been made at all, does not choose the best course.
God made a world wherein there is evil; a world, I say, which could have been made without any evil or which need not have been made at all.
[378] Therefore God did not choose the best course.
ANSWER
I admit the minor of this prosyllogism: for one must confess that there is evil in this world which God has made, and that it would have been possible to make a world without evil or even not to create any world, since its creation depended upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, that is, the first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism, and I might content myself with asking for its proof. In order, however, to give a clearer exposition of the matter, I would justify this denial by pointing out that the best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil, since it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good. For example, the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory. I have proved this in further detail in this work by pointing out, through instances taken from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in the part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. I have followed therein the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times that God permitted evil in order to derive from it a good, that is to say, a greater good; and Thomas Aquinas says (in libr. 2, Sent. Dist. 32, qu. 1, art. 1) that the permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe. I have shown that among older writers the fall of Adam was termed felix culpa, a fortunate sin, because it had been expiated with immense benefit by the incarnation of the Son of God: for he gave to the universe something more noble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created beings. For the better understanding of the matter I added, following the example of many good authors, that it was consistent with order and the general good for God to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity to exercise their freedom, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil: for God could easily correct the evil, and it was not fitting that in order to prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way. It will therefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world with evil may be better than a world without evil. But I have gone still further in the work, and have even shown that this universe must be indeed better than every other possible universe.
[379] OBJECTION II
If there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, there is more evil than good in all God's work.
Now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures.
Therefore there is more evil than good in all God's work.
ANSWER