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Theodicy

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von · 1710-1711 primary

passage 135 of 360 · book with much acrimony. But the accused won his case in a Synod. > PART ONE (37/39)

↪ you wandered here via “Christ as example of predestination” — the connecting lines are tinted below

in brief
Leibniz defends that God has just reasons for election even if unknown, discusses Universalists versus Particularists via antecedent versus consequent willing, and distinguishes “destination” from “predestination” regarding damnation.

effect. And if those who deny this universal will do not allow that the antecedent inclination be called a will, they are only troubling themselves about a question of name.

  1. But there is a question more serious in regard to predestination to eternal life and to all other destination by God, to wit, whether this destination is absolute or respective. There is destination to good and destination to evil; and as evil is moral or physical, theologians of all parties agree that there is no destination to moral evil, that is to say, that none is destined to sin. As for the greatest physical evil, which is damnation, one can distinguish between destination and predestination: for predestination appears to contain within itself an absolute destination, which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of those whom it concerns. Thus one may say that the reprobate are destined to be condemned, because they are known to be impenitent. But it cannot so well be said that the reprobate are predestined to damnation: for there is no absolute reprobation, its foundation being final foreseen impenitence.

  2. It is true that there are writers who maintain that God, wishing to manifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy of him, but unknown to us, chose the elect, and in consequence rejected the damned, prior to all thought of sin, even of Adam, that after this resolve he thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise these two virtues, and that he has bestowed grace in Jesus Christ to some in order to save them, while he has refused it to others in order to be able to punish them. Hence these writers are named 'Supralapsarians', because the decree to punish precedes, according to them, the knowledge of the future existence of sin. But the opinion most common to-day amongst those who are called Reformed, and one that is favoured by the Synod of Dordrecht, is that of the 'Infralapsarians', corresponding somewhat to the conception of St. Augustine. For he asserts that God having resolved to permit the [167] sin of Adam and the corruption of the human race, for reasons just but hidden, his mercy made him choose some of the corrupt mass to be freely saved by the merit of Jesus Christ, and his justice made him resolve to punish the others by the damnation that they deserved. That is why, with the Schoolmen, only the saved were called Praedestinati and the damned were called Praesciti. It must be admitted that some Infralapsarians and others speak sometimes of predestination to damnation, following the example of Fulgentius and of St. Augustine himself: but that signifies the same as destination to them, and it avails nothing to wrangle about words. That pretext, notwithstanding, was in time past used for maltreating that Godescalc who caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century, and who took the name of Fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author.

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topics: fate, destiny, and necessity · judgment, heaven, and hell · the nature and attributes of God

Theodicy · Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Freiherr von · 1710–1711