The Orations of Lysias

EVIDENCE.

6. Now probably, gentlemen of the jury, he will make no denial of these facts, but will say before you, as he dared to affirm before the arbiter, that one does not use a forbidden word in saying some one has "killed" his father, for the law does not forbid this, but forbids the use of the word "homicide." 7. But I think that you should make your decision not about the letter of the law, but its intention. You all know that those who kill others are homicides, and those who are homicides kill others. For it would be a great task for a lawgiver to write all the words having the same signification, but in mentioning one term, his meaning covers all. 8. This is the case then, is it not, Theomnestus,--if any one called you a beater of father or mother, you would think he should be punished, but if any one said you beat your father or mother, you would then think he should go unfined as saying no forbidden word! 9. For I should like to hear from you (for in this you are skilled in practice and speech). If any one should say you "flung away" your shield, and in the law was written that a man was liable to punishment if any one declares he "threw it away," would you not have prosecuted him, and would it have been enough for you to say if some one declared you "flung it away," I do not care, for flinging and throwing are not the same thing. 10. Now could you admit the charge as one of the Eleven, if some one brought in a man on the charge of having stripped off his cloak or shirt but you would have discharged him because he was not called a "clothesstealer." And if any one should be caught carrying off a boy, you would not say he was a kidnapper, if you quibble with terms, and will not pay attention to the facts to express which terms are invented. 11. Consider this now, gentlemen of the jury. For this man seems never to have gone to the Areopagus through indolence and indifference. For you all know that there, whenever they are conducting a trial for murder, they do not make their depositions with this term, but with that by which I have been abused. For the prosecutor makes a deposition that "he killed," the defendant that "he did not kill." 12. Accordingly it would be absurd to acquit the one who evidently committed murder because he pleads he is a murderer, when the prosecutor charges the defendant of "killing." For what is the difference of which this man speaks? And you yourself brought suit against Theon for saying you "flung away" your shield. Nothing is said in the law about "flinging," but if any one declared he has "thrown away" his shield, it decrees a fine of 500 drachmae. 13. Would it not be terrible if whenever it were necessary for you to punish your enemies for slander, for you to interpret the laws as I do now, but whenever you speak illegally of another, to think you ought not to be punished? Are you so powerful as to be able to employ the laws as you wish, or have you such influence as to believe that those whom you wrong will not get a recompense? 14. Are you not ashamed to have the thought that you should claim advantages, not from your services to the state, but from your unpunished deeds? But read me the law.

LAW.

15. I now, gentlemen of the jury, assume that you all know that I speak to the point, but he is so clumsy that he cannot understand what is said. So I wish to inform him also from other laws about these things, that even now while he is on the platform, he may be informed and may give you no further trouble. Now read me the old laws of Solon.