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An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

David Hume · 1750-1769 (composition of the Enquiry; earlier draft/revisions around the mid-1750s to 1760s) primary

passage 76 of 90 · SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. > PART II. (11/25)

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in brief
Hume further defends disinterested benevolence against selfish theories, claiming they require extraordinary paradoxes, that complex explanations can destroy the activity of affections, and that animals display kindness without artifice.

speculative science of human nature, and is a proper object of curiosity and enquiry. It may not, therefore, be unsuitable, in this place, to bestow a few reflections upon it.

[Footnote: Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the GENERAL and the PARTICULAR. The first is, where we have no friendship or connexion or esteem for the person, but feel only a general sympathy with him or a compassion for his pains, and a congratulation with his pleasures. The other species of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue, on services done us, or on some particular connexions. Both these sentiments must be allowed real in human nature: but whether they will resolve into some nice considerations of self-love, is a question more curious than important. The former sentiment, to wit, that of general benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy, we shall have occasion frequently to treat of in the course of this inquiry; and I assume it as real, from general experience, without any other proof.]

The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and observation, and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish passions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love of SIMPLICITY which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy. I shall not here enter into any detail on the present subject. Many able philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these systems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the smallest reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer.

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topics: animals and their habits · friendship and loyalty · justice as a virtue

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals · David Hume · 1750–1769