HKB

← back

On War

Carl von Clausewitz · c. 1816–1830 (work compiled/rewritten across these years) primary

passage 343 of 539 · BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR > CHAPTER XVI. Defence of Mountains (*Continued*) (7/7)

in brief
Clausewitz uses a dioptric-focus analogy to argue that even if mountain defense seems weaker, supporting an army in mountains and uncertainty about where the enemy fights prevent attackers from gaining a reliable advantage.

in the original have by some means become transposed, their equivalents—level and mountainous—are here placed in the order in which it is presumed the author intended the words to stand.—Tr.

It is here as in dioptrics, the image represented becomes more luminous when moved in a certain direction, not, however, as far as one pleases, but only until the focus is reached, beyond that the effect is reversed.

If the defensive is weaker in the mountains, that would seem to be a reason for the assailant to prefer a line of operations in the mountains. But this will seldom occur, because the difficulties of supporting an army, and those arising from the roads, the uncertainty as to whether the enemy will accept battle in the mountains, and even whether he will take up a position there with his principal force, tend to neutralise that possible advantage.

← previous passage read in the full work → next passage →

topics: reason and the intellect · strategy and the aims of war · supply, logistics, and encampment

On War · Carl von Clausewitz · 1816–1830