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Ethics — Part 3

Benedictus de Spinoza · 1660s-1670s, published 1677 primary

passage 35 of 39 · (35/39)

in brief
Spinoza defines approval, indignation, partiality, envy, sympathy, self-approval, humility, repentance, pride, self-abasement, honour, and shame, then links morality to education and social expectations.

XXI. "Partiality" is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.

^^^^^Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and disparagement an effect of hatred: so that "partiality" may also be defined as "love, in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object." Contrariwise, "disparagement" may be defined as "hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object." Cf. III. xxvi. note.

XXIII. "Envy" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.

^^^^^Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be thus defined:

XXIV. "Sympathy" (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.

^^^^^Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to II. xxiv. and xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.

XXV. "Self-approval" is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

XXVI. "Humility" is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.

^^^^^Explanation--Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:

XXVII. "Repentance" is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.

^^^^^Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly called "wrong," are followed by pain, and all those, which are called "right," are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories therein.

XXVIII. "Pride" is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.

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topics: education and the training of the young · honor, shame, and reputation · justice as a virtue

Ethics — Part 3 · Benedictus de Spinoza · 1665–1677